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Summary. 
Section 1 of this work argues the case for full reserve banking. Section 2 
explains the flaws in a large number of arguments put AGAINST full 
reserve, and section 3 explains the flaws in a few arguments put IN 
FAVOUR of full reserve. 
 
~ 4 ~ 
 
 
Abbreviations. 
FDIC. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. FDIC is a self-funding 
insurance system for small banks in the US. 
FR. Full Reserve Banking.   
MCC. Money Creation Committee. 
MMT. Modern Monetary Theory. 
MPC. Monetary Policy Committee (of the Bank of England). 
NSI. National Savings and Investments (a UK government run savings 
bank). 
PM.  Positive Money. 
QE. Quantitative easing. 
TBTF.  Too Big to Fail. 
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Section 1: Introduction to full reserve banking. 
 
1.   Full reserve banking in brief. 
The term full reserve (FR) refers here to the system advocated by the 
following, amongst others. 
1.Kotlikoff (2012, p.43). However, for a quick introduction to Kotlikoff’s 
ideas see Klein (2013). 
2. Werner (2011). 
3. Friedman (1960, Ch3, starting at heading entitled “Banking Reform” ).  
4. Dyson (2012).  
5. Cochrane (2013). 
6. Fisher (1936). 
FR is sometimes called “100% reserve banking” and here is a very brief 
thirty five word summary of FR, (in bold italics). 
 
The bank industry is split in two. One half offers totally safe 
accounts where money is simply lodged at the central bank. The 
other half offers normal bank loans, but that half is funded only by 
shares. 
 
As for a longer summary (about 1,400 words), that is as follows. 
The existing banking industry is split in two. One half offers depositors 
accounts which are totally safe (or as near total safe as it is possible to 
get). And that safety is not brought about by any sort of artificial taxpayer 
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funded subsidy as is the case with safe accounts under the existing 
system. Under FR, safety derives from the fact that the money 
concerned is GENUINELY SAFE. That is, relevant sums are not 
invested in anything the least risky: the money is just lodged at the 
central bank. But possibly (as advocated by Friedman) some money is 
invested in short term government debt. Thus “safe” money earns little 
or no interest, but IT IS instant access. 
The second half of the industry lends to mortgagors, industry and so on. 
But that half of the industry is funded just by shareholders, or 
stakeholders who are in effect shareholders. For example under 
Kotlikoff’s system, both halves of the industry consist of mutual funds 
(“unit trusts” in the UK), with the first half consisting of money market 
mutual funds that place money only at the central bank (and possibly 
also invest in government debt) and the second half consisting of non-
money market mutual funds which lend to mortgagors, businesses and 
so on.  And those with a stake in non-money market mutual funds are in 
effect shareholders, in exactly the same way as those with stakes in 
existing non-money market mutual funds are in effect shareholders, 
though those “shareholders” are not normally referred to as such. 
As to Friedman’s system, there again, the entities making up one half of 
the former banking industry are separate from the entities making up the 
second half. In contrast, under Werner’s system, safe accounts and 
accounts which lend on account holders’ money are offered under the 
same roof. However, the basic principle of all three systems is the same. 
Those two halves of the industry will be referred to below as the “safe” 
and “lending” halves. 
As to what reserves the lending half is required to have under FR, there 
is no good reason for it being required to have ANY, as is already the 
case for banks in several countries (though those banks do maintain a 
small stock of reserves so as to enable them to settle up with each 
other). Thus the phrase “full reserve” is a bit of misnomer in that half the 
banking industry under FR might have almost no reserves. But like many 
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misnomers in English and other languages, the phrase has established 
itself. 
 
Stimulus. 
As to how stimulus is implemented under FR, that can be done in at 
least three different ways. 
1. Interest rate adjustments. 
2. As advocated by Werner (2011) and Dyson (2012), it can be done by 
adjusting the amount of base money created and spent by government 
and/or adjusting taxes.  That is, the amount that government spends net  
of tax collected can be adjusted. 
As for who decides what amount of stimulus is suitable at any point in 
time, the conventional view there is that stimulus should be decided by 
some sort of independent committee of economists: the Bank of England 
Monetary Policy Committee being an example of that sort of committee: 
which has decided on interest rate adjustments for many years.  
In similar vein, Werner and Dyson advocate that in the case of adjusting 
government net spending, that should be decided by a committee like 
the MPC. Note that such a committee (as in the case of the existing 
MPC) would decide PURELY how much stimulus was suitable. That it is, 
the committee WOULD NOT intrude on POLITICAL questions, like what 
proportion of GDP to allocate to public spending any more than the 
existing MPC intrudes in that way. 
As to the relative merits of adjusting interest rates versus adjusting 
government net spending, that is discussed in section 1.6 below, and the 
conclusion is that Werner and Dyson are correct: that is, interest rate 
adjustments are a poor way of regulating demand. 
3. For those who do not like allegedly “undemocratic” committees, like 
existing central bank committees or Werner and Dyson’s proposed 
“Money Creation Committee”, having POLITICIANS determine stimulus 
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is always a possibility. Thought the dangers of allowing politicians 
access to the printing press are widely appreciated, which is why a 
majority of economists and others are not keen on the idea. 
 
The basic rule of FR. 
The basic rule governing FR can actually be reduced to about 10 words, 
as follows. 
 
 “All lending entities above some minimum size must be funded 
just by shareholders”. 
 
That rule necessarily implies that entities which accept deposits which 
are supposed to be totally safe cannot lend (other than, as per 
Friedman’s suggestion, lend to government). 
Anyone aware of the fact that simple rules (like E-MC2 in physics) may 
be of fundamental importance, should have their interest in FR aroused 
by the above ten words. That should be contrasted with the Byzantine 
complexity and questionable effectiveness of existing attempts at bank 
regulation, like Vickers (2011) in the UK or Dodd-Frank in the US. 
To summarise, those who want their money loaned on or invested under 
FR carry the full costs or risks involved. That would tend, firstly to raise 
interest rates, second to cut total loans and debts, and in consequence, 
the total amount invested would decline a bit. The cut in investment  
might seem to be a weakness in FR. However, note that interest rates 
rise ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT a subsidy of the bank industry or 
lending industry has been removed. And since subsidies distort markets 
and reduce GDP, the removal of the latter subsidy would INCREASE 
GDP, rather than reduce it. But there is plenty more on that point below. 
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The advantages of FR. 
1. No more bank failures.  No bank or lending entity can SUDDENLY 
fail in the way banks have failed regular as clockwork over the centuries. 
In contrast, a SLOW DECLINE of a lending entity / bank under FR is 
perfectly possible, resulting perhaps in a takeover by a stronger entity. 
The reason banks cannot fail under FR is as follows.  
As to safe entities / accounts, the money there is near completely safe. 
And as to lending entities, if lending is done in an incompetent manner, 
all that happens is that the value of the relevant shares (or mutual fund 
units) falls: the actual entity does not become insolvent. 
As George Selgin put it in his book on banking, Selgin (1988), “For a 
balance sheet without debt liabilities, insolvency is ruled out…”. 
(Incidentally, that was an aside made by Selgin: his book did not actually 
advocate FR). 
2. Improved stability. The above stability of lending entities / banks 
reduces the severity of the boom bust cycle. There is more on that point 
in Section 2.32 below. 
3. Bank subsidies vanish.  The near impossibility of bank failures 
means that the TBTF and other bank subsidies can be removed under 
FR.  
4. Depositor / investors choose.  Under FR, depositor / investors 
HAVE A CHOICE as to what is done with their money. That is in contrast 
to the existing system where so to speak, banks can use grandma’s 
saving to bet on risky derivatives. Given the latter choice, the large 
majority of former bank depositors would probably opt for something 
conservative, like having their money fund safe mortgages (e.g. 
mortgages where householders had a minimum 20% or so equity stake). 
And that ought to reduce the amount of irresponsible lending. 
5. No limit to deposit guarantees. There is no need under FR to limit 
deposit guarantees, as pointed out by Dyson (2012). That is, there is no 
need to limit to the amount of money that households or firms can keep 
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in a totally safe manner. That is in contrast to the existing system where 
governments usually guarantee the safety of only a limited amount of 
money per person (£85,000 in the UK at the time of writing).  
The reason for that limit is that under the existing system, government 
(i.e. taxpayers) run a GENUINE RISK under the latter £85,000 type 
guarantee because the money is GENUINELY not entirely safe. In 
contrast, under FR, money in safe accounts really is safe, thus there is 
no reason for £85,000 type limits. 
Also, the deposit guarantee is only available to INDIVIDUAL PEOPLE in 
some countries. There is no reason for not allowing FIRMS to have a 
totally safe method of storing money in any quantity they want. 
 
2.   More on the deposit guarantee. 
There are two arguments that can be put against the latter points on 
deposit guarantees.  
First, in the UK, depositors can actually lodge up to £1million with total 
safety at National Savings and Investments, which renders the above 
merit in FR near irrelevant in the case of the UK. However, that £1million 
type facility is not available in EVERY country. So for some countries, 
the above deposit guarantee merit in FR would be very real. 
Moreover, the very fact that UK citizens make extensive use of NSI is 
evidence that there is a demand to totally safe accounts of the sort 
offered under FR. 
Second, it could be argued that anyone with more than about £85,000 in 
spare cash is rich enough to look after themselves, thus the “no limit” as 
under FR is not a huge advantage. On the other hand £85,000 is only 
about a third the cost of the average house in the UK at the time of 
writing. Thus anyone selling a house or small business before buying a 
replacement runs the risk of losing a huge sum if a bank collapses 
before the new house or business is bought. So the “no limit” 
characteristic of FR is a definite advantage.  
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Incidentally, selling a house before buying a replacement is not 
uncommon and can make sense, if the seller can find somewhere to live 
in the interregnum without too much trouble (maybe rented 
accommodation or living with relatives). Having a pile of cash puts them 
in a good bargaining position when it comes to buying the replacement 
house.  
 
3.   Defects in recent attempts at bank regulation. 
Several authorities have pointed to the very defective nature of recent 
attempts to improve bank regulation. The following are a sample. 
1. Article by Britain’s former prime minister, Brown (2013), entitled 
“Stumbling Towards the Next Crash”.  The title says it all.  
2. The main British investigation into banks was conducted by the so 
called “Vickers Commission”: see Vickers (2011). For a scathing 
indictment of the Vickers report, see Kotlikoff (2012). 
3. The former head of the UK’s Financial Services Authority, Turner 
(2014),  said: “…already agreed reforms to financial regulation, though 
undoubtedly valuable, are inadequate to prevent a future repeat of a 
2007-8 style crisis.”  
4. The main US proposals for bank reform are in the so called “Dodd-
Frank” act. John Cochrane (2013) started his paper with the words, “In 
recent months the realization has sunk in across the country that the 
2010 Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation is a colossal mess.”   
5. Article by Schiller (2014) entitled “The Financial Fire Next Time”.  
6. On the subject of Dodd-Frank, Richard Fisher, President of the Dallas 
Federal Reserve Bank said, “We contend that Dodd–Frank has not done 
enough to corral “too big to fail banks” and that, on balance, the act has 
made things worse, not better.” (Fisher (2013)).  
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In contrast to the latter criticism of Dodd-Frank by Fisher, Krugman 
(2014b) claims Dodd-Frank has substantially reduced the TBTF subsidy. 
But even if Krugman is right, that still leaves several banking problems 
which are solved by FR but not by attempts at reform to date, like Dodd-
Frank. 
 
4.   Doesn’t a 25% or so capital ratio bring near total 
safety? 
FR imposes a 100% capital requirement on lending entities / banks, with 
a view, amongst other things, to making them failure-proof. But it might 
seem that a capital requirement of around 25% as advocated by Admati 
(2013) and by the chief economics commentator at the Financial Times, 
Wolf (2012), makes it near impossible for lending entities to fail, plus that 
can be backed up with FDIC type bank insurance to ensure that in the 
event of failure, depositors do not lose out. As Wolf (2012) put it, “I 
accept that leverage of 33 to one, as now officially proposed is 
frighteningly high. But I cannot see why the right answer should be no 
leverage at all. An intermediary that can never fail is surely also far too 
safe.” 
In fact the arguments for “25% plus FDIC” are flawed, and for numerous 
reasons as follows.  
1. Assets can fall more than 25%.  In the case of small banks in the 
US, it is far from unheard of for their assets to fall to below 75% of 
liabilities, and in that case a 25% capital ratio clearly will not save the 
day. However, let us assume that in the case of large banks a 25% or so 
ratio makes failure near impossible. 
2. Taxpayer funded insurance is a subsidy.  Some bank deposit 
insurance (e.g. in the UK) is taxpayer funded, and that’s an obvious 
nonsense: that constitutes a subsidy of banks. In contrast, a self-funding 
FDIC bank insurance system at least has the merit of not being 
subsidised by taxpayers.  
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3. Insurance does not cut irresponsibility. Insurance, even when it is 
self-funded, does not greatly reduce irresponsibility, and the 
irresponsibility shown by bankers in recent years has been disgraceful. 
Reason is that as with any insurance system, if you know that given 
irresponsibility, the “insurance company” pays, then there is little 
incentive to behave responsibly. In contrast, under FR, where 
irresponsible loans are made, it is PURELY those funding the relevant 
loans who foot the bill. That reduces irresponsibility, while of course not 
totally eradicating it. 
4. A logical self-contradiction.  25% plus FDIC is actually a logical 
self-contradiction. Put another way, it is an idea that can be reduced to 
an absurdity, as follows.  
There are basically THREE types of subsidy enjoyed by banks at the 
moment. They are, 1, lender of last resort facilities offered by central 
banks at favourable rates of interest, rather than the “penalty rates” 
advocated by Walter Bagehot, 2, taxpayer funded deposit insurance, 
and 3, the TBTF subsidy. Banks in any given country do not necessarily 
enjoy ALL THREE subsidies. But certainly banks in most countries enjoy 
at least one of the latter three subsides. 
Now if the authorities think that a 25% or so capital ratio makes 
conventional banks COMPLETELY safe, then they will be happy to 
remove all subsidies. But of course the authorities NEVER ARE 
prepared to remove all subsidies, which is an admission that banks are 
NOT entirely safe, which in turn means banks need underpinning by the 
state or subsidising to put in plain English. And subsidies misallocate 
resources. So that does not make sense. 
ON THE OTHER HAND, if it is thought that a 25% or so capital ratio 
really DOES MAKE banks entirely safe, then there is no difference 
between the risk run by bank shareholders and depositors. That is, 
shareholders and depositors essentially become the same thing. And 
that is what full reserve consists of: it is a system where only 
shareholders fund lending entities / banks. 
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So logically there are just two possibilities. Number one is less than 
entirely safe banks which need subsidising, which does not make sense 
because subsidies misallocate resources. Number two is FR. In short, 
the existing bank system is in check mate. 
A possible escape from that check mate might seem to consist of 
removing lender of last resort and TBTF while retaining self-funding 
deposit insurance. But the problem there is that assuming the insurance 
premium is pitched at the right level, it will equal the difference between 
the return demanded by shareholders and depositors. 
To illustrate with a simple example, suppose the chance of a bank failing 
to the extent of wiping out depositors is 1% in any given year and that 
that is the only risk. The appropriate premium would obviously be 1% of 
total deposits. But if as an alternative, there is NO DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE, then depositors will want a bigger return, and to cover the 
additional risk they run, they’ll demand an extra 1%. Thus as far as costs 
of funding the bank go, there is no difference between the latter two 
scenarios. 
The conclusion is that if the above “logic” holds, then only one set up 
makes sense, and that is FR. 
5. Money creation. The next flaw in 25% plus FDIC is that under that 
system, private banks create a form of money, whereas under FR they 
do not. As Friedman (1960, Ch3) put it in reference to the half of the 
banking industry which loans to mortgagors, etc, “The other institution 
that would be formed . . . . would have no power to create or destroy 
money”. Now leaving commercial banks with the power to create money 
is problematic for the following reasons. 
i) Duplication of effort. Given that central banks already create a form 
of money (base money), letting commercial banks do likewise is at least 
on the face it, duplication of effort. Duplication of effort is of course 
justified if there is some very good reason for duplication. However, as is 
shown below, this particular type of duplication is just a nuisance. 
~ 15 ~ 
 
ii) Pro-cyclicality. Commercial bank money creation and destruction is 
pro-cyclical, whereas if it’s just the state that issues money, it can issue it 
in a manner designed to iron out cycles. Indeed, the state ALREADY 
HAS TO DO THAT. For example the large scale money creation 
involved in QE that took place around 2012/13 was designed to iron out 
a cycle – caused partially if no mainly by erratic commercial bank money 
/ credit creation.  
As Fisher (1936) put it in relation to cycles, “The most outstanding fact of 
the last depression is the destruction of eight billion dollars - over a third 
- of our "check-book money" - demand deposits.” 
In short, having commercial banks “help” in the money creation process 
is a bit like having your child “help” you control the steering wheel in a 
car. The child will just be a nuisance: that is, you’ll have to counteract 
the inevitable silly moves or “iron out the cycles” that the child is 
responsible for. So it is best just to forbid the child access to the steering 
wheel. 
However, forbidding private money creation may not iron out cycles all 
that much during the UPSWING. Reason is that as explained in section 
1.12 below, commercial banks cannot create money without the 
assistance of willing depositors / lenders. And those lenders, absent the 
availability of commercial bank money can always lend DIRECT to 
mortgagors and so on. Indeed, CDOs enable them to do that. However 
CDOs are not everyone’s cup of tea, thus banning commercial bank 
money creation should have at least a finite stabilising effect. Put 
another way, as indicated in the Irving Fisher quote just above, the main 
stabilising effect of banning commercial bank money creation is probably 
that it reduces the severity of crashes. 
iii) Private money production is costly. Money creation by commercial 
/ private banks is inherently more expensive than money creation by 
central banks. Reason is that to create money, commercial banks have 
to check up in the creditworthiness of borrowers, e.g. check up on the 
value of collateral deposited. In contrast, central banks do not have to. 
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A legitimate objection to the latter point might seem to be that 
commercial bank money creation is a free market activity, thus if there is 
a demand for commercial bank money, why not let market forces 
operate? The answer to that is that commercial bank money creation is 
based on a fraud: the promise by commercial banks to pay interest on 
money deposited WHILE AT THE SAME TIME promising to repay $X to 
depositors for every $X deposited.  
The reality is that when money is invested or loaned on, it is not entirely 
safe, thus the latter promise is fraudulent. And it is the latter fraud that 
enables commercial bank money to compete with central bank money 
despite the above mentioned fact that money creation by commercial 
banks is inherently more expensive than money creation by central 
banks.  
In short, if commercial banks were honest, instead of making the above 
promise, they’d tell customers that in the event of the bank making a 
series of silly loans, depositors stand to make a loss. But that pretty 
much turns depositors into shareholders: which is what FR consists of! 
(For more on the fraudulent nature of fractional reserve banking, see 
2.31 below.) 
iv) Modigliani Miller. Another apparent advantage of 25% plus FDIC as 
compared to 100% is that depositors require a smaller return on capital 
than shareholders, thus it might seem that banks can be funded more 
cheaply under a 25% regime than a 100% regime. The quick answer to 
that, of course, is “Modigliani Miller”.  
As Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller explained, the relatively high 
return demanded by shareholders simply reflects the risks they run, plus 
the TOTAL RISK involved in funding a given bank is a GIVEN. Thus if 
the risks are spread over a larger number of shareholders, there is no 
change to the TOTAL CHARGE that shareholders will make for covering 
the risks involved in funding a particular bank. In short, apart from the 
above mentioned increase in bank funding costs that derive from the 
removal of bank subsidies, bank funding costs are not increased by 
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raising the above 25% to 50% or even to 100%. (See Admati (2013b) for 
more arguments behind the latter point). 
v) Corruption. If the capital ratio IS RAISED to just 25% (or any other 
non-100% level) banks will simply bribe and cajole politicians and 
regulators over the years into reducing the ratio back down to the 3% or 
so that has obtained over the last decade or so.  In contrast, 100% is a 
clear line in the sand.  
Indeed, George Osborne, Britain’s finance minister, has campaigned 
against ANY IMPROVEMENT WHATEVER in the capital ratio. The fact 
that his political party, the Conservatives, is partially funded by banks is 
of course entirely coincidental. (See Wolf (2013)). 
And on the subject of “bribes and cajoling” note that the British finance 
industry spends about £90m a year on lobbying politicians, according to 
Mathaison (2012), while in  Europe as a whole, there are 1,700 lobbyists 
working for banks (Corporate Europe Observatory (2014)). 
 
5.   The inherent defect in privately created money. 
Money has taken many forms thru history: gold coins, tally sticks and so 
on. Nowadays nearly all money is a liability of banks: commercial banks 
and central banks. To be more accurate, money is certainly a liability of 
a commercial bank, while the extent to which money is a liability of a 
central bank is more debatable – (see section 2.2 below). 
So money is a debt owed by a bank, plus it is a debt that is more or less 
fixed in value (inflation apart). That is, $100 buys about the same 
selection of goods in a week’s time as it buys today. 
But the glaring problem with an entity that has liabilities that are fixed in 
value and assets that CAN FALL in value (e.g. when unwise loans are 
made) is that when the assets DO FALL in value, the relevant entity / 
bank is on its way to insolvency or is actually insolvent. And the brute 
fact is that banks have failed regular as clockwork throughout history. 
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That problem can be solved by having government (i.e. taxpayers) stand 
behind commercial banks. But that amounts to a subsidy, and subsidies 
are frowned on in economics, and quite right: unless there is some very 
good justification for subsidies, they reduce GDP. 
Another alternative is some sort of self-funding insurance for banks, but 
that has problems which are explained in section 1.4 above. 
However, FR disposes of bank liabilities that are fixed in value: the only 
liabilities (if you can call them that) on the balance sheet of a lending 
entity under FR are shares, which by definition and in practice vary in 
value by significant amounts. 
So is the abolition of privately created money a problem? Well not really 
because (as mentioned above) CENTRAL BANKS ALREADY ISSUE a 
form of money. Thus there is nothing to stop central banks supplying 
ALL MONEY, or whatever amount of money is needed to keep an 
economy working at capacity.  
 
Bitcoin changes value. 
An obvious exception to the idea that money is not money if it changes 
significantly in value is Bitcoin, which has changed value dramatically in 
recent years. The answer to that is that Bitcoin types of money will never 
take off in a serious way, at least in that the vast majority of individuals 
and firms are not interested in seeing the contents of their bank 
accounts suddenly halve in value. 
Moreover, it is totally unrealistic to think that that US government will let 
any Bitcoin system displace the US dollar, and same goes for other 
countries. Bitcoin has already been banned in Russia. 
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6.   Interest rate adjustment is a defective tool. 
An alternative to having the state adjust the amount of new base money 
spent into the economy (net of changes to tax) is to regulate demand via 
interest rate adjustments. 
And the conventional wisdom is certainly that interest rate adjustments 
should be one of the more important tools when it comes to adjusting 
demand. In fact there is VERY LONG LIST of problems involved in 
interest rate adjustments as follows. 
1. Distortion. Interest rate adjustments are DISTORTIONARY. An 
interest rate change works only via households or firms which are 
significantly reliant on variable rate loans. I.e. those reliant on FIXED 
rate loans or not reliant on loans at all are not directly affected by an 
interest rate change. Thus interest rate changes affect one set of 
households and firms, but not another set. So to that extent, interest rate 
adjustments make about as much sense as any other distortionary 
method of adjusting demand you care to think of: e.g. boosting an 
economy only via people with black hair, with blondes, red-heads, etc 
waiting for a trickle-down effect. 
A possible answer to the latter point, is the common claim that TAXES 
are distortionary. And that is of relevance here because in the case of 
the Werner / Dyson “adjust government net spending” system, one way 
of adjusting government net spending is to adjust taxes.  
The suggestion that taxes are distortionary is a popular one: the 
suggestion was put for example by Bullard (2011) and Wren-Lewis 
(2014b).  
 
However, there is a simple answer to the above “distortionary taxes” 
point which is that clearly taxes CAN BE distortionary: e.g. a tax on red 
cars but not cars with a different colour. On the other hand a flat 
percentage tax on everyone’s income would be almost completely 
distortion free. 
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2. Availability of credit. The idea that there is a close relationship 
between interest rates and the ACTUAL availability of credit is VERY 
QUESTIONABLE given that between around 2010 and 2014, interest 
rates were at record lows but banks were reluctant to lend. 
3. Empirical evidence.  A recent study done by the Federal Reserve 
(Sharpe (2014)) found little relationship between interest rates and 
investment spending. 
4. Bubbles.  Interest rate reductions can cause asset price bubbles.  
5. Market forces. The price of borrowed money should, at least on the 
face of it, be determined by the same system that determines the price 
of coal, oil, steel and a million other commodities: supply and demand. 
That is there are good reasons, set out in the economics text books, for 
thinking that GDP is maximised where prices are set at market prices 
(except where there are strong social reasons for thinking otherwise). 
Thus if the state interferes with the free market rate of interest, then on 
the face of it, the total amount invested will not be optimum and GDP will 
not be maximised. 
 
6. Investors look at the long term. Low interest rates allegedly 
encourage investment. Unfortunately those making investments look at 
LONG TERM rates, not the fact that the central bank has recently cut 
rates and will probably raise them again in two years’ time. And that 
applies both to borrowing by firms and by households.  
 
While most people will not buy houses just because interest rates have 
dropped for a couple of years, there ARE those NINJA mortgage 
incompetents who bought houses on the basis of near zero interests for 
the first year or two. I.e. there ARE incompetents out there. So in that 
the “low interest rates encourages investment” argument DOES WORK, 
it works at least partially by encouraging incompetents to be 
incompetent! Now that’s not a ringing endorsement for the “low interest 
rates encourage investment” argument. 
 
~ 21 ~ 
 
7. Investment not needed in recessions. The idea that reduced 
interest rates encourage investment is rendered near irrelevant by the 
fact that in a recession, more investment is exactly what is NOT needed. 
In recessions (certainly in SHORT recessions) there is more than the 
usual amount of capital equipment lying idle! Of course it takes TIME to 
manufacture or create real investments like machinery or factories, and 
assuming an economy will return to trend growth shortly after a 
recession, employers need to make sure they are not SHORT of capital 
equipment after a recession. But employers do not need governments to 
tell them this. Nor will irrelevant little inducements like 2% changes in 
interest rates do much to optimise any given employer’s investment 
strategy. 
 
8. Radcliffe Report.  The Radcliffe investigation into monetary policy in 
the U.K. published in 1960 concluded that ‘there can be no reliance on 
interest rate policy as a major short-term stabiliser of demand’. 
 
9. Credit cards. Credit card interest rates are not influenced by base 
rates. See UK CreditCards.com (2009) and Insley (2011). 
 
10. Keynes.  Keynes said, “I am now somewhat skeptical of the success 
of a merely monetary policy directed towards influencing the rate of 
interest...it seems likely that the fluctuations in the market estimation of 
the marginal efficiency of different types of capital...will be too great to 
be offset by any practicable changes in the rate of interest." Keynes’s 
General Theory – near the end of Ch 12.  
 
11. Lags. It is sometimes argued that monetary policy (interest rate 
adjustments at any rate) can be made quickly, i.e. fiscal changes take 
longer to implement. 
 
That point is irrelevant. The IMPORTANT question is TOTAL TIME LAG 
between the decision to implement a policy and the actual effect.  
An article entitled “How Monetary Policy Works” (Bank of England (no 
date given)) estimated the maximum effect of interest rate adjustments 
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came after about ONE YEAR. In contrast when it comes to tax rebates, 
Johnson (2006) found that, nondurable consumption increased by about 
two thirds of the rebate during a six-month period (close to 40 percent 
during the three-month period of the rebate, and the remaining in the 
following three months). So on that basis, there is no huge difference 
between lags in the case of monetary and fiscal policy: in fact fiscal 
policy looks like being slightly better. 
Also, in that increasing government net spending consists of expanding 
the PUBLIC SECTOR, the effect ought to be pretty well IMMEDIATE. 
That is, if government decides to hire additional people, the effect comes 
just as quickly as people can be interviewed, and hired. 
 
12. Borrowing from abroad. The objective in raising interest rates is to 
cut demand in the country concerned. Unfortunately raising interest 
rates induces foreigners to buy government debt. But that temporarily 
boosts the value of the country’s currency on foreign exchange markets. 
And that is just an uncalled for or “nuisance” effect. That is exports and 
importers are inconvenienced and for no good reason. 
13. Fiscal versus monetary policy. There is disagreement amongst 
economists as to how effective monetary and fiscal stimulus is. That 
problem can be solved by doing both at once: that is, simply creating 
new base money and spending it, and/or cutting taxes. 
If one policy is much more effective than another, it doesn’t matter: the 
COMBINATION is guaranteed to have an effect. 
14. Galbraith.  J.K.Galbraith said (correctly): “firms borrow when they 
can make money, not because interest rates are low”. And that intuitive 
point is backed by evidence: see Schoder (2013). 
15. Interest rate adjustments promote inequality.  In order to adjust 
interest rates at all, there must be a stock of government debt on which 
interest is paid. And to achieve that, the state must issue debt (forgive 
the statement of the obvious). But what is “government debt”? Well it’s 
simply a liability of the state. But the state already issues a liability of a 
sort, namely base money. 
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So in order for there to be government debt, the government must issue 
what might be called an “excessive” stock of liabilities. That is, it must 
issue not just the stock of base money that gives us full employment: it 
must issue so much that the private sector has to be induced NOT TO 
SPEND the excess by lending it back to government (at interest). 
But it’s taxpayers that fund that interest and a significant proportion of 
taxpayers are on average incomes or less, while those with an excess 
stock of base money will tend to be the better off. Thus the set up 
required to enable interest adjustments to be used to influence demand 
is one that promotes inequality! 
16. Central banks.  It could be argued that where a boom is caused by 
additional investment spending (some of which will inevitably be funded 
by more borrowing), having the central bank raise interest rates is the 
suitable tool for countering such a boom.  
The first answer to that is that in practice, central banks do not make 
much of an effort to work out the cause of booms and confine interest 
rate rises just to cases where the boom is caused by increased 
investment. Put that another way, central banks do not, given a 
CONSUMER led boom, try to persuade the fiscal authorities (i.e. the rest 
of the government machine) to impose deflationary measures of a fiscal 
nature (i.e. reduce public spending or tax increases). 
Second, even to the extent that central banks DO COUNTER investment 
led booms with interest rate rises, that “countering” will not be successful 
to the extent that investment is funded out of retained earnings. 
17. Werner.   For more arguments and evidence on the deficiencies of 
interest rate adjustments, see Werner (1997). 
 
7.   It is not just FR advocates who want to vary the amount 
of base money created and spent. 
Regulating aggregate demand by adjusting the amount of new base 
money created and spent (net of any change to taxes) rather than 
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regulating demand via interest rate adjustments is not an idea supported 
just by advocates of FR. In fact several countries during the 2008-14 
recession put the latter idea into effect on a large scale in that they 
implemented fiscal stimulus and followed that with QE. The reasons why 
fiscal stimulus plus QE comes to the same thing as “create and spend” 
are set out in the paragraph in italics just below.  
Also, advocates of Modern Monetary Theory tend to back the create and 
spend idea, as does Hillinger (2012): see his p.3, paragraph starting “An 
aspect of…”. Also Wren-Lewis (2014) advocates the idea, at least near 
the zero bound. 
 
Why “create and spend” equals fiscal stimulus plus QE. 
Assume “fiscal stimulus” consists of government borrowing $X, spending 
$X and giving $X worth of blonds to those it has borrowed from. If the 
central bank than prints $X and buys back those bonds, that all comes to 
the same thing as the state printing $X and spending it. The only slight 
difference is that under the former, the central bank is left holding $X of 
bonds. But that simply amounts to one arm of government (the central 
bank) being owed $X by the rest of the government machine, which is a 
bit like your right hand pocket owing money to your left hand pocket: it’s 
basically meaningless. 
 
8.   New base money should be spread widely. 
To repeat, the decision as to how to allocate new base money under 
Dyson and Werner’s system is left to politicians, but there is the question 
as to whether that new money should be allocated to any SPECIFIC 
types of public spending or particular types of tax cuts (as advocated by 
Ryan-Collins (2013)). In fact there is a very good reason for NOT 
concentrating the extra spending or tax changes to specific areas to too 
great an extent. That is, in the case of extra spending, the new money 
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should be spread fairly evenly over the economy as a whole and for the 
following very simple reason.  
The amount of stimulus economies need varies hugely from one year to 
the next. If stimulus money is all concentrated on say education, the 
result will be big gyrations on the total amount spent on education. And if 
there is one way of getting bad value for money from expenditure (public 
or private), it’s to implement dramatic increases or reductions in the type 
of spending involved. 
 
9.   A bit less investment would not matter. 
The word “investment” is imbued with near magical qualities for the 
unsophisticated, and the sophisticated know it and exploit the fact. For 
example Britain’s former prime minister, Gordon Brown, regularly 
referred to CURRENT spending in the public sector as “investment” with 
a view to promoting public sector spending. No doubt that fooled a 
majority of the population and more than a few so called “professional” 
economists.  
Investment also satisfies a primordial emotional craving: that’s the idea 
that sacrifice (in this case sacrificing current consumption so as to fund 
investment) must bring benefits. That primordial emotion also explains 
the popularity of austerity: that is, “we spent excessively prior to the 
crisis, so that can only be put right by sacrifices to the Gods, aka 
austerity”.   
Anyway, moving on from caveman psychology to 21st century 
economics, there is a widely accepted principle in economics which is 
that subsidies do not make sense, absent a very good social reason for 
a subsidy. That is, subsidies misallocate resources, i.e. reduce GDP. 
And FR removes the subsidies currently enjoyed by lenders, thus under 
FR interest rates would rise, thus there would be a decline in 1, the total 
amount loaned, 2, debts and 3, investment. 
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However, subsidising lenders in effect subsidises investment, that is, it 
leads to a more than optimum amount of investment. Thus FR in 
returning total mounts invested to something nearer the optimum ought 
to RAISE GDP, not reduce it. 
Moreover, a relatively small proportion of investment is funded by bank 
lending. Reason is that banks lend to businesses for relatively short 
periods (at least in the UK) and have a habit of not rolling over, or 
renewing their loans. Investments in contrast last for a decade or more, 
thus it makes sense for a business to fund them out of retained 
earnings, shares and so on, rather than bank loans. 
Conclusion. Investment would decline under FR, but the decline would 
be small, plus far from reducing GDP, the effect ought to be too 
INCREASE it. 
 
10. FR is being imposed on MMFs in the US. 
At the time of writing, the US Securities and Exchange Commission is 
trying to impose the rules of FR on Money Market Mutual funds, which 
casts doubt on any claims that FR is difficult or impractical. See Weiner 
(2014) and SEC (2014). 
To be more exact, the SEC is going to forbid MMFs that invest in 
anything more risky than base money or government debt from 
promising depositors they’ll get $X back for every $X deposited. In 
contrast MMFs THAT DO invest in anything more risky will have to let 
depositors’ stake in the MMF float in value along with the value of 
underlying assets. And that is FR, pure and simple. 
To quote from SEC (2014), “The SEC is removing the valuation 
exemption that permitted institutional non-government money market 
funds (whose investors historically have made the heaviest redemptions 
in times of stress) to maintain a stable net asset value per share (“NAV”), 
and is requiring those funds to sell and redeem shares based on the 
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current market-based value of the securities in their underlying 
portfolios….” 
As to what the SEC calls “Government MMFs” (i.e. MMFs that lodge 
depositors’ money in an ultra-safe fashion), they say: 
“The fees and gates and floating NAV reforms included in today’s 
Release will not apply to government money market funds, which are 
defined as a money market fund that invests at least 99.5% of its total 
assets in cash, government securities..”. 
There is of course an anomaly here which is that FR is being imposed 
on MMFs but not on regular banks. And given that there is not a big 
difference between the two, those running MMFs may well try to use 
their political connections to have the SEC’s proposals reversed. 
Another interesting development is that the New Zealand Labour Party is 
contemplating giving their central bank a say on fiscal stimulus, which 
looks very much like the “create base money and spend it” policy 
advocated by some  advocates of full reserve. See O’Brien (2014). 
 
11. Benes and Kumhof’s debt jubilee. 
An IMF working paper, Kumhoff (2012) advocated FR but included a 
HUGE debt jubilee in the process of converting to FR. That is not 
necessary: that is, the arguments for and against debt jubilees are 
entirely separate from the arguments for and against FR. So why did 
Kumhof combine the two? 
The answer is that IT MIGHT SEEM that it is not possible to dispose of 
the sort of debt based money created by commercial banks without 
disposing of the relevant debt. That is not true. To illustrate, gold coins 
(so called “sovereigns”) were used as money in the UK in the 1800s, but 
they went out of use. But that did not mean that the actual gold 
disappeared. 
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Same applies to debt. Debt CAN BE used as money, but ceasing to use 
it in that way and adopting some other form of money does not mean the 
relevant debt necessarily vanishes. The way to achieve a “jubilee free” 
conversion to FR is set out in section 2.42 below. 
 
12. FR forces banks to find savers before loans are made? 
The above criticism of FR was made by Pettifor (2014), and the answer 
to that criticism is as follows. 
It might seem that under the existing system banks can lend without 
bothering about whether they have adequate deposits to fund such 
lending. Or to use a popular phrase “loans precede deposits”. That 
apparent merit in the existing system is in fact entirely illusory, and for 
the following reasons. 
Assume to start with that the economy is at capacity / NAIRU (that 
assumption is relaxed a few paragraphs hence). If commercial banks 
create money out of thin air and lend it out, that money must end up in 
the accounts of various depositors. Now if the latter are not willing to 
leave the money there for an extended period, i.e. if they are not savers, 
they will try to spend away their excess stock of money which will raise 
demand. But that is not permissible if the economy is at capacity. So the 
central bank will probably raise interest rates, which will cut lending. The 
net effect, approximately, is “no additional lending”. 
Alternatively if the central bank does not raise rates, then inflation will 
ensue, which will cut the value of existing loans in REAL TERMS. So 
again: “little or no additional lending”. 
To put all that another way, the fact that loans precede deposits does 
not mean that lenders can do without depositor / savers. Apples have to 
be grown before they are eaten. But that does not mean apple growers 
can do without apple eaters! 
As to where the economy IS NOT at capacity, then having commercial 
banks create money and lend it out would be beneficial. Unfortunately it 
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is very questionable as to what extent that phenomenon actually occurs. 
That is, as Keynes pointed out, economies can get stuck in high 
unemployment equilibria, and commercial banks will probably not come 
to the rescue. 
Put another way, commercial bank loan / money creation is pro-cyclical: 
banks create and lend out money like there is no tomorrow in a boom, 
exactly when we do not want them to. Then come a recession, their 
lending / money creation slows down or stops, again, exactly what we do 
not want. 
Conclusion.  In effect, banks have to find savers before they can lend 
UNDER THE EXISTING SYSTEM. Thus the fact of having to do the 
same under FR is irrelevant.  
 
13. The basic flaws in Vickers. 
The basic flaw in Vickers. 
Vickers (2011) was roughly speaking the UK equivalent to Dodd-Frank 
in the US. And the basic remedy for bank problems proposed by Vickers 
was similar to Glass-Steagall, namely that the bank industry should be 
split into a safe / retail section and an investment / casino section. 
The Vickers commission did consider FR, or so they claimed. In fact as 
is shown in 2.36 below, they had no grasp of FR.  For the moment, we 
will just consider the basic flaws in Vickers’s proposals which are as 
follows. 
1. According to Vickers, investment banks should be allowed to fail, 
while retail ones should not. However, Vickers was of course aware of 
the chaos caused by the collapse of the large US investment bank, 
Lehmans. So what was Vickers’s answer to that dilemma? Well rather 
than produce some sort of definitive answer to the latter quandary, 
Vickers just fudged the question as to whether large investment banks 
should actually be allowed to fail. That is what you might call a bit of a  
“self-indictment”. That is, if you propose that the solution for a problem is 
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to permit X, but you then fudge the question as to whether X should 
actually be allowed to occur, that indicates muddled thinking. 
In contrast, under FR, it is virtually impossible for banks to fail: if they 
make unwise loans or investments, the value of their shares decline, but 
they cannot go insolvent. So FR solves the above awkward question 
which Vickers fudged. 
Incidentally it now seems that Lehmans’s assets actually exceeded its 
liabilities all along. In short, the collapse of Lehmans was caused by the 
risks that the existing banking system allowed it run. In contrast, under 
FR, Lehmans would not have collapsed. Indeed, under FR when 
Lehmans’s problems were at their worst, its shares would not even have 
declined to the extent that shareholders are in it for the long run. And as 
long as they know that assets of the entity in which they hold shares 
exceed its liabilities, those shareholders will not be too worried.  
2. While it might seem easy to distinguish between bank activities that 
ought to be in the investment / casino section and the retail / safe 
section, in fact it is not easy. For example Vickers could not decide 
which half to place standard banking services for large UK corporations 
in (Vickers, p.12). And standard banking services for large corporations 
is a significant chunk of the banking industry!  
Now if you postulate that the bank industry (or anything else) falls 
naturally into two halves, and it then turns out that there are significant 
shades of grey between the two halves, that seriously calls into question 
the very idea that the two halves are “natural” in any way. In contrast, 
under FR, there is a much clearer distinction between the two halves: 1, 
a totally safe method of lodging money, and 2, a method of lodging 
money which involves the slightest bit of risk. 
Indeed, the above “large corporation” was far from the only important 
question that Vickers failed to answer. Kotlikoff (2012, p.60) lists a whole 
selection of other details which Vickers failed to work out and which they 
“left to the regulators” to decide. 
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The latter failure by Vickers to sort out details reinforces a point made 
earlier, namely that FR has all the beauty of E-MC2: it is simple and 
effective. Science attaches importance to simple laws or equations 
which seem to explain a lot. That is, science is sceptical of complexity. 
3. The idea that retail banks are totally safe is clearly not true. A large 
proportion of, if not the majority of retail banking, consists of loans to 
mortgagors. And it is clear from those “No Income No Job or Assets” 
mortgages in the US, that loans to mortgages can go astray or involve 
excessive risk. And as to the UK, Northern Rock’s loans were almost 
exclusively to mortgagors, yet Northern Rock failed. 
In short, the simple fact of separating banking into a safe / retail section 
and an investment / casino section does not make the first half safe.  
The conclusion has to be that the BASIC IDEA behind the Vickers 
proposals is a mess. Of course that Vickers or “Glass-Steagall” type idea 
can be made to work given a HUGE NUMBER of associated or 
complementary rules and regulations. But that is not the point. The 
important point is that FR is simplicity itself. In contrast, Vickers is 
“complexity itself”, which is exactly what the smart lawyers working for 
banks want. To illustrate, under FR, all the state really needs to check 
up on is first whether banks have at least as much by way of base 
money at the central bank and/or government debt as the total amount 
placed in safe accounts at the bank by depositors. Second, the state or 
auditors need to check that banks when they claim to be investing 
money in specific assets (e.g. safe mortgages, the chemical industry or 
whatever) ACTUALLY invest in those assets. However those sort of 
checks on EXISTING mutual funds (unit trusts in the UK) do not seem to 
absorb a huge amount of taxpayers’ money, or auditors time, thus there 
is no reason to suppose the equivalent checks in the case of FR would 
absorb much taxpayers’ money. 
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14. Kotlikoff versus Dyson and Werner. 
Dyson (2012) and Werner (2011) advocate an FR system under which 
lending entities / banks can fail. In contrast, Kotlikoff advocates a system 
where they cannot. This section compares the two systems and 
concludes in favour of Kotlikoff. 
First, Dyson’s system is THE SAME as Kotlikoff / Friedman in that those 
who want a sum of money to be totally safe have it lodged or invested in 
a way that is totally safe: i.e. they put it into an entity or account where 
relevant sums are simply lodged at the central bank (and perhaps also 
invested in short term government debt).  
Also under both systems, those who want their money loaned on or 
invested have a choice as to what is done with their money. 
However, the basic difference between the two systems is that Dyson 
and Werner’s system allows entities in the investment/lending half of the 
industry to fail, whereas Kotlikoff does not. That is, Dyson and Werner’s 
system promises stakeholders in lending entities $X back for every $X 
they invest until such time as the entity has obviously failed, at which 
point the entity is would up, and investors get less than 100 cents in the 
dollar. 
In contrast, under Kotlikoff’s system that person buys into a unit trust 
(mutual fund in the US) of their choice. If the unit trust makes poor loans 
or investments, then those with a stake in the trust take a hair-cut 
assuming they sell out when the poor loans or investments become 
apparent. A stakeholder can of course hold on in the hopes that the 
value of their stake recovers. Obviously the value of that stake 
constantly varies, as is normal with stakes in unit trusts. 
Now the obvious problem with the Dyson / Werner system is that in the 
event of poor loans being made and the lending entity being wound up, 
investors end up getting much the same as had the same poor loans 
been made under the Kotlikoff system! That is, if at some point in time 
there are only say $0.8 of assets to back every $1 put in by investors / 
stakeholders, then under Kotlikoff’s system, investors would find their 
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stakes were worth about $0.8. In contrast, under Dyson and Werner’s 
system, the bank or mutual fund is wound up and stakeholders get about 
80 cents in the dollar. I.e. the basic difference is that when poor loans 
are made under the Kotlikoff system, the lending entity soldiers on, while 
under the Dyson / Werner system it is closed down – and for no very 
good reason. 
Or rather Dyson (2012, p.184) does produce some reasons, but they are 
flawed. He says: 
“Investment accounts will be risk-bearing: If some borrowers fail to repay 
their loans, then the loss will be split between the bank and the holder of 
the Investment Account. This sharing of risk will ensure that incentives 
are aligned correctly, as problems would arise if all the risk fell on either 
the bank or the investor. For example, placing all the risk on the account 
holder will incentivise the bank to make the investments that have the 
highest risk and highest return possible, as the customer would take all 
the downside of bad investment decisions.” 
Now there are four problems with that passage, as follows. 
1. What does a “bank” consist of under FR? Under FR, the lending 
entities that replace the lending activities of existing banks scarcely hold 
any assets. To illustrate, if all sums deposited at a so called “bank” are 
invested in mutual funds (a la Kotlikoff), what assets does the bank itself 
have? The answer is “virtually none”. Put another way, so called banks 
under FR become mutual fund administrators (or “fund managers” to 
quote Coppola (2014)): they become entities that don’t themselves hold 
any assets – or scarcely any. It is thus hard to see how such an 
“assetless” entity can bear any losses. 
2. The conflict. The above passage of Dyson’s conflicts with the 
paragraph at the bottom of the same page which says investors (as 
pointed out above) have a choice as to what is done with their money, 
and that the categories of assets that investors can go for will be set by 
government. As Dyson puts it, “The broad categories of investment will 
need to be set by the authorities”. 
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So, assuming banks obey the law and only put money into say relatively 
safe mortgages where that’s what investors want, then they are not ipso 
facto being “incentivised to make the investments that have the highest 
risk and highest return possible..”.  
3. Existing mutual funds / unit trusts. In fact with EXISTING UNIT 
TRUSTS (a system where it’s essentially those who buy units who carry 
all losses and profits) there doesn’t seem to be a need for government to 
interfere to any great extent: that is, existing unit trusts which declare 
that a particular trust will invest in say German and French government 
debt or the chemical industry DO JUST THAT: invest in German and 
French government debt or the chemical industry. I.e. they don’t try to 
allocate money in some sort of underhand way to riskier investments. 
The only slight reservation to the latter point is that managers of existing 
unit trusts are normally on some sort of bonus dependent on the 
performance of investments they make. And there’d be no harm under 
Dyson’s scheme in banks putting investment managers on some sort of 
bonus. But bonus schemes are common throughout the economy: that is 
very roughly half the employees in the country are on some sort of 
bonus scheme.  So in that sense it could be said that “banks” share 
profits and losses. But any such bonus, both with existing unit trusts and 
under PM’s scheme would be a small proportion of total amounts 
invested and total profits and losses on those investments. So all in all, 
the latter “bonus” point is near irrelevant. 
4. No incentive to take risks. The REASON WHY existing unit trusts / 
mutual funds do not take big risks and why the funds set up under FR 
would not do so either is not hard to fathom. It is as follows. 
Under the existing banking system, the temptation to take excessive 
risks stems from the knowledge that of the risks go badly wrong, the 
taxpayer foots the bill. In contrast, with a mutual fund, there is no 
taxpayer waiting to pick up the pieces when it all goes wrong. 
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Where banks carry all the risk. 
Dyson continues: 
“Alternatively, if the bank takes all the risk by promising to repay the 
customer in full regardless of the performance of the investments, then 
the account holder would face no downside and would consequently 
only be motivated by high returns, regardless of the risk taken. This 
would force banks to compete by offering higher interest rates in order to 
attract funds, which they would then need to invest in riskier projects in 
order to make a profit.” 
Well that scenario is to all intents and purposes what the EXISTING 
bank system involves! Indeed, the last sentence of the latter quote to the 
effect that the existing system tempts banks to take excessive risk is 
spot on. I.e. the latter quote is not, as Dyson implies, a way of running a 
full reserve system: IT IS THE EXISTING SYSTEM.  
 
Conclusion. 
Kotlikoff’s system is simpler than Dyson and Werner’s and better. 
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Section 2: Flawed arguments against FR. 
 
This section deals with the large number of arguments put against FR by 
so called “professional” economists. About half the arguments are 
anything but “professional”. Indeed, demolishing half these arguments 
requires no knowledge of economics at all: it simply requires a grasp of 
logic. For a quick taste of some of the dafter arguments, see Nos 7, 8, 
13 and 17 below. Each argument below has a heading, followed by one 
or more of the following. 
1. An explanation of the exact nature of the relevant anti-FR argument. 
2. References to works where the relevant anti-FR argument appears.  
3. A paragraph starting with the word “Answer” in which the start of the 
explanation as to why the relevant argument is flawed. 
 
1.   FR limits the availability of credit? 
That alleged weakness in FR was put by Van Dixhoorn (2013, p.21), 
Vickers (2011, para 3.21.) and Kregel (2012). See Kregel’s passage 
starting, “In a narrow banking system..”. And Coppola (2012) claims FR 
involves a  “serious restriction on the nature and scope of bank lending”.  
Answer. FR certainly limits the availability of credit in that it requires 
those who fund loans and investments to carry the risk involved (as 
opposed to the existing system where the taxpayer carries much of the 
ultimate risk). And that means the cost of funding loans and investments 
will rise a bit. But that rise in the cost of borrowing simply reflects the 
removal of a subsidy. Other than that, there is no reason for the cost of 
borrowing to rise. 
As to the demand reducing effect of that reduced availability of credit, 
that is easily dealt with by standard stimulatory measures (the measure 
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favoured by some advocates of FR,  being to simply create new base 
money and spend it into the economy and/or cut  taxes). 
As to any other reasons there might be for Coppola’s “serious restriction” 
she does not tell us what they are. The conclusion is that her use of the 
word “serious” is pure rhetoric. Indeed, the use of emotive phraseology, 
unbacked by argument or evidence was also the best that Vickers 
(2011) could do when considering the effect that FR might have on 
investment (see section 2.36, paragraph starting “Very high”). 
As to her “nature and scope”, that implies that some forms of lending are 
reduced more than others. But again, she gives us no details. The 
conclusion again is that the words “nature and scope” are just there for 
effect – rhetoric.  
There is however a change of the “nature and scope” type that would 
presumably occur on implementing to FR. That is that under FR, lenders 
foot the entire bill when loans go wrong, thus IRRESPONSIBLE loans 
ought to decline under FR. 
While Coppola does have a very good grasp of details about what 
individual banks around the world are doing, she clearly has not 
bothered to study FR in detail to judge by her comments on Kotlikoff 
(2012). She claims Kotlikoff’s version of FR “includes its own version of 
what in the UK is known as the Tote”. (That’s a horse betting system). 
She then goes on to criticise a system that involves betting along the 
lines found in horse racing. 
Well if banking a la Kotlikoff really did involve something similar to 
betting on horses, then Coppola would doubtless have a point. However, 
Tote type betting or “paramutuel” betting is a system that Kotlikoff 
advocates for INSURANCE COMPANIES, not for banks, as he explains 
in section 4 of his book. 
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2.   Central bank money is not debt free? 
Van Dixhoorn (2013, p.21) claimed that base money, i.e. central bank 
produced money is not debt free because all money is form of debt. 
Answer. In a minor and near irrelevant sense the above “all money is 
debt” idea is right: that is, base money or central bank created money is 
NOMINALLY a debt owed by the central bank to the holder of that 
money. Indeed British £10 notes and other notes actually state “I 
promise to pay the bearer on demand the sum of £10”. 
But of course that “promise” is a farce. That is, anyone trying to get £10 
of gold (or anything else) from the Bank of England in exchange for their 
£10 note, would be told to go away (perhaps assisted by the police). 
Thus in effect, central bank created money is indeed debt free. 
In contrast, for every dollar of money created by commercial banks there 
is, or so it seems, a dollar of debt (owed by a borrower to a commercial 
bank). But even that argument is debatable (see 3.1 below). 
It could be argued that base money is a debt in the following sense. A 
characteristic of a debt is that it can be used to nullify and equal and 
opposite debt. Thus when government suddenly demands $X of tax from 
you, you can use base money to pay them (in fact it’s the only money 
they will accept). Thus it could be argued that base money BECOMES a 
debt when you receive a tax demand. But that is not the normal meaning 
of the word “debt”.  
 
3.   Bank capital is expensive for tax reasons? 
Increasing bank capital as occurs under FR would involve a cost in that 
the tax treatment of equity is more onerous that in the case of deposits. 
That idea was put in a Brookings Institution paper, Elliot (2013). 
Answer. The above argument contains an extremely simple flaw, 
namely that tax is an ENTIRELY ARTIFICIAL imposition, and should 
thus be ignored. To illustrate, if government taxed red cars more heavily 
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that blue cars, that would raise the price of red cars. But that would not 
be evidence that the REAL COST of producing red cars was any more 
than the cost of blue cars.  
 
4.   FR means the end of banks? 
The above was claimed by Coppola (2014) in an article entitled “Martin 
Wolf Proposes the End of Banking.” 
The key paragraph of Coppola’s article reads “But there is a problem. 
The functions that distinguish “banks” from other financial institutions are 
credit intermediation (deposit-taking and lending) and maturity 
transformation (borrowing short, lending long). Once banks no longer do 
either of these, they cannot be regarded as banks. They are simply 
shops. Once again, we are faced with the death of commercial banking.” 
Answer. The fact of proposing a root and branch reform of something to 
such an extent that normal definitions of the word “bank” or any other 
word become  obsolete is not an argument against such reform. Indeed 
Klein (2013) in explaining Kotlikoff’s verson of FR entitled his article “The 
Best Way to Save Banking is to Kill It”. So Coppola’s point that FR in 
some senses of the word means an end to banking is a point that 
advocates of FR are already aware of! 
 
5.   Central banks will still have to lend to commercial 
banks? 
To deal with any lack of availability of credit, the central bank will 
allegedly still need to lend to commercial banks under FR which exposes 
the central banks to risks. Thus FR does not dispose of risks for 
taxpayers. That idea was put by Van Dixhoorn (2013). See paragraph 
starting “Fourth, we consider…” (p.34).    
Answer. Given that under FR it is near impossible for a bank to go 
insolvent (possibly followed by credit crunches etc), there would certainly 
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be FAR LESS NEED under FR for central banks to lend to commercial 
banks. As to taking that a bit further and having a TOTAL BAN on 
central bank loans to commercial banks, there are some not bad 
arguments for doing that, and as follows.   
The flaw in the above argument about lending to commercial banks 
when there is a “lack of availability of credit” is that it assumes 
bureaucrats and/or politicians are better judges of what proportion of 
GDP should be allocated to investment than the free market, a highly 
questionable assumption. Most advocates of FR believe in simply having 
the authorities implement enough GENERAL STIMULUS to keep the 
economy at full employment, while market forces determine what 
PROPORTION of GDP is allocated to investment. Moreover, increased 
stimulus (i.e. increased demand) will itself increase lenders’ willingness 
to lend. That is, when it comes to deciding whether to lend to a firm, 
there is nothing that encourages a firm to borrow and a bank manager to 
lend like the knowledge that a firm has a healthy order book. As 
J.K.Galbraith put it, “firms borrow when they can make money, not 
because interest rates are low”. 
As to the above questionable judgement of bureaucrats and politicians, 
a classic example of the sort of false logic used by bureaucrats and 
politicians occurred in the recent crisis. Essentially they argued that 
banks have made large losses, therefor they should be supplied with 
enough taxpayers’ money to enable them to get back to approximately 
where they were before the crisis.  
In any normal industry, the fact that losses are made is taken as an 
indication that the industry is too large and needs to contract. And as to 
the fact that if the total amount of lending declines if the banking industry 
declines which in turn reduces aggregate demand, AD can easily be 
bumped up again by standard stimulatory measures. 
Indeed, according to King (2010) the assets of banks in Britain are now 
TEN TIMES what they were relative to GDP in the 1960s, a period when 
economic growth was very respect able compared to the disaster of the 
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last five years or so. And that is additional evidence that a smaller bank 
industry would not do any great harm. 
 
6.   FR stops banks producing money from thin air which 
can fund investments? 
When a private bank grants a loan, it might seem that the relevant 
money comes out of thin air and that money can be used to fund 
investments. Thus (so it might seem) people do not really need to save 
in order to fund investments. That idea was put by Pettifor (2014) and 
Kregel (2012).  See Kregel’s passage where he claims that FR would 
create a system “in which all investment decisions….” See Pettifor’s 
paragraph starting “Unlike commodity money…”. 
Answer. The idea that we don’t need to save in order to fund 
investments (houses, office blocks, etc) is just too good to be true. And 
as the old saying goes, if anything seems to be too good to be true, it 
probably is. To put it more bluntly, the idea that we do not need to save 
or sacrifice current consumption in order to produce investments is 
straight out of cloud cuckoo land. 
As explained in section 1.12 above, banks cannot lend without willing 
savers. 
 
7.   Investments under FR might not be viable? 
That is an idea put by Kregel (2012). See his passage starting “First, the 
real investments chosen….” 
Answer. The advocates of FR do not claim that investors will be any 
more competent under FR than under the existing system. Clearly under 
both systems there are, or will be competent and incompetent investors. 
 
~ 42 ~ 
 
8.   FR will not reduce pleas by failing industries to be 
rescued by government? 
That idea was put by Kregel (2012). See his passage starting “There 
would always be a risk…” 
Answer. Advocates of FR do not claim that FR is a solution to 
corruption: in particular, politically well-connected individuals trying to 
extract taxpayers’ money from politicians. You really have to wonder 
what else Kregel will accuse FR of failing to achieve: stopping AIDS or 
some other disease? 
 
9.   The cost of converting to FR will be high?  
That “high conversion cost” argument was put by Van Dixhoorn (2013, 
p.21 and Warner (2014). 
Answer. Yes, and the cost of building a ship or airliner can be described 
as “high”. But of course the CRUCIAL question is: what is the LONG 
TERM cost to benefit ratio? 
Assuming a country benefits from FR and continues to benefit for the 
next century or two, then transition costs are probably near irrelevant 
compared to the long term benefits. Moreover, as one advocate of FR 
(Friedman (1960 Ch3)) put it “There is no technical problem of achieving 
a transition from our present system to 100% reserves easily, fairly 
speedily, and without serious repercussions on financial or economic 
markets”. 
 
10. Central bank committees won’t be politically neutral? 
The argument there is that FR can involve some committee of 
economists (and perhaps others) deciding on how much money to 
create and spend, or deciding on other forms of stimulus, and there is no 
guarantee such a committee will be independent or politically neutral. 
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That argument was put by Van Dixhoorn (2013, p.22), Pettifor (2014) 
and Coppola (2012). See Pettifor’s paragraph starting “Wolf’s proposal is 
problematic….”.  
Answer. There are several answers to the above alleged political 
neutrality problem, and as follows. 
1. As explained above, the large majority of economists and indeed the 
majority of the population are quite happy with specialist committees 
taking various decisions, both when it comes to stimulus and in other 
areas, like health, education and so on. However, and as was also 
explained above, if the population particularly wanted POLITICIANS 
ALONE to take stimulus decisions, that would be perfectly feasible under 
FR. 
2. There is no reason why the above alleged problem should be any 
more (or less) of a problem than with EXISTING committees that 
determine stimulus. For example there is the Bank of England Monetary 
Policy Committee which has a HUGE INFLUENCE on stimulus (via 
interest rate adjustments, quantitative easing, etc). Other countries 
obviously have similar committees. And those committees most certainly 
do not interfere with strictly political decisions, like how much the country 
should spend on health or education, or what proportion of GDP should 
be taken by public spending. 
3. Dyson (2012) and Werner (2011) (and doubtless other advocates of 
full reserve) are VERY SPECIFIC on the point that the above sort of 
committee should UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES interfere with political 
decisions. The exact way this is done under Dyson’s system is for the 
“committee” to decide HOW MUCH money should be net spent into the 
economy over the next six months (or some other period of time), while 
the EXACT WAY that money is spend (or whether the adjustment to net 
spending comes in the form of adjustments to tax) is left ENTIRELY to 
politicians and voters. 
4. It is odd that those who complain about the alleged lack of political 
neutrality of Positive Money’s Money Creation Committee have been 
~ 44 ~ 
 
very silent about the lack of political neutrality of similar EXISTING 
committees like the Bank of England MPC. 
 
11. Administration costs of FR would be high? 
The “high administration cost” criticism was made by Van Dixhoorn 
(2014) and Krugman (2014). See Krugman’s paragraph starting 
“Cochrane’s proposal calls for…”. 
Answer. Obviously the central bank or some other body of bank 
regulators would have to do a fair amount of auditing of commercial 
banks to make sure they were obeying the rules. But such auditing is 
necessary under the EXISTING SYSTEM. Moreover, compare that with 
the rules which make up the Dodd-Frank regulations: those stand at 
10,000 pages and counting. Compared to Dodd-Frank and Vickers 
(2011) FR is simplicity itself. 
 
12. The cost of current accounts will rise under FR? 
That criticism was put by Van Dixhoorn (2013, p.22) and Aziz (2014). 
Answer. It is true that under FR, those with transaction / safe / current / 
checking accounts get little or no interest: i.e. probably less interest than 
on such accounts under the existing system. However interest under the 
existing system only comes as a result of being able to have one’s 
money loaned on or invested with the taxpayer carrying the ultimate risk. 
But the latter is a totally unwarranted “have your cake and eat it” 
subsidy. 
If restaurants had been subsidised for the last century and that subsidy 
was removed, then (to use Van Dixhoorn’s phrase) “losses would be 
imposed on” those eating at restaurants. But that would not justify 
continuing to subsidise restaurants. 
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13. FR is dependent on demand injections? 
Kregel (2012) made the above criticism. 
Answer. It would be nice to know how Kregel would describe the trillions 
of dollars recently used to bail out the bank industry and the large 
amounts of stimulus needed to rectify the effects of the recent crisis. 
Kregel uses the phrase “chronically dependent on demand injections” in 
reference to FR. The phrase would seem more appropriate to the 
existing banking system, rather than to FR. 
Moreover, stimulus costs nothing in real terms: to put it figuratively, 
printing and spending dollar bills (and/or cutting taxes) costs nothing. Or 
as Friedman ( 1960,  Ch 3) put it, “It need cost society essentially 
nothing in real resources to provide the individual with the current 
services of an additional dollar in cash balances.” 
 
14. The effect of FR on inflation and unemployment is 
unclear?  
That is a criticism put by Van Dixhoorn (2013). As Van Dixhoorn put it: “it 
would be difficult to predict what the ultimate effects on output and 
inflation would be..”. 
Answer. There is NO NEED WHATEVER to predict what the effect on 
output or inflation would be because the latter two can be adjusted (just 
as they are under the existing system) by adjusting stimulus. That of 
course is done under the existing system by adjusting interest rates, QE, 
the size of the deficit, etc. In contrast, most advocates of FR advocate a 
slightly different form of stimulus (which actually amounts to fiscal 
stimulus plus QE). But that’s a minor technical point. 
Moreover, under the EXISTING SYSTEM, governments have only the 
haziest ideas as to what inflation and unemployment will be five years 
from now: e.g. there might be another credit crunch, or there might not. 
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Thus the above criticism applies to the EXISTING SYSTEM as much as 
it does to FR. 
 
15. FR would drive business to the unregulated sector? 
The above “unregulated” criticism was made by Krugman (2014): 
passage starting “If we impose 100% reserve..” and by Diamond (1986) 
and by Vickers (2011 , 4.36). 
Answer. Clearly if government regulates just one part of an industry, 
that will cause a number of operators to flee to the unregulated sector. 
And that has indeed happened over the last decade. That is, there has 
been a shift of business away from official banks and into the shadow 
bank sector. But the simple solution to that is to regulate ANY ENTITY 
above a certain size that amounts to a bank. 
As the former head of the UK’s Financial Services Authority, Turner 
(2012) put it: "If it looks like a bank and quacks like a bank, it has got to 
be subject to bank-like safe-guards." 
Indeed, regulating one half of the banking industry but not the other half 
(the shadow banking industry) makes about as much sense as forcing 
male drivers to abide by speed limits, but not female drivers, or vice 
versa.  
 
16. The state cannot be trusted with peoples’ 
money? 
The idea there is that the so called “safe accounts” set up under FR are 
not entirely safe, a criticism made by (Van Dixhoorn (2013) section VIII, 
p.32. 
Answer. Clearly governments are not entirely reliable and for two 
reasons. First, governments may cause excess inflation, which means 
that sums deposited in safe accounts lose their value, and second, 
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governments have been known to renege on promises to return sums 
they have borrowed or which have been lodged with them. However, 
neither of those two points are good criticisms of FR and for the 
following reasons. 
As to inflation, if money lodged at the central bank is losing its value, 
then money lodged at a private bank will lose value at exactly the same 
rate. 
And as to the point that governments can renege on promises to return 
monies lodged with them, the sort of government which does that is 
quite likely to also confiscate monies lodged at private banks. 
Moreover, FR is a system suitable for a country with a reasonably 
responsible government. Obviously where government is near non-
existent or chaotic, citizens might well be better off keping their savings 
under the mattress and/or in the form of valuables like a rare metal. 
And finally, under the existing system, millions of UK citizens seem to be 
happy to lodge a portion of their money with National Savings and 
Investments, a state run savings bank. That is, the reality is that a large 
proportion of the population in Britain or any “non-chaotic” country 
regard government as being responsible enough to be entrusted with a 
portion of their wealth. 
 
17. Vested interests would oppose FR? 
The Economist (2014) claimed that vested interests would oppose FR. 
Their exact words were: “there would be formidable opposition from 
vested interests” 
Answer. The abolition of slavery was opposed by formidable “vested 
interests”. Do we take it The Economist would have opposed the 
abolition of slavery? In short, the fact that “vested interests” want X or Y 
is no argument for X or Y. Indeed, if anything it’s an argument AGAINST 
X or Y. 
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However, credit where credit is due: The Economist were at least correct 
to say that FR would be opposed by “vested interests”. Although that is 
not a brilliantly perceptive point in that ANY ATTEMPT to clean up the 
corrupt cess-pit that is banking will pretty obviously be opposed by 
“vested interests”. 
Incidentally Milton Friedman’s explanation for the failure to implement 
FR cited vested interests (Friedman (1960)) . As he put it, “The vested 
political interests opposing it are too strong, and the citizens who would 
benefit both as taxpayers and as participants in economic activity are too 
unaware of its benefits and too disorganised to have any influence.” 
 
18. FR will reduce innovation by banks?  
That criticism was put by Van Dixhoorn (2013, p.22) and Aziz (2014). 
Answer. Under the EXISTING SYSTEM, commercial banks introduced 
debit and credit cards because those cards are more efficient for many 
transactions than cash or cheques. Any bank that had ignored those 
innovations would have lost customers. And exactly the same would 
apply under FR. That is, under FR, commercial banks would open 
current / checking / safe accounts for customers. And as to the EXACT 
WAY in which payments are made, that would be up to individual banks. 
And competitive forces would induce banks to adopt any sort of new 
technology (e.g. payment by mobile phones) just as those forces induce 
them to adopt new technology under the existing system. 
 
19. Deposit insurance and lender of last resort solves 
banking problems? 
I.e. there is no need for FR, a claim made by Aziz (2014)).  
Answer. As to the existing deposit insurance system, the problems with 
that were dealt with above under the heading “What’s wrong with FDIC 
type bank insurance plus a 25% capital ratio rather than a 100% ratio?” 
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As to lender of last resort (a luxury not available to other industries) that 
is a SUBSIDY of the banking industry. As it explains in the introductory 
economics text books, subsidies misallocate resources, that is, they 
reduce GDP (unless some very good social justifications can be found 
for the subsidies.) 
Incidentally, and contrary to common perception, Walter Bagehot did not 
approve of lender of last resort (Bagehot (1873), final chapter). He 
regarded it as something that was so ingrained in the system that it 
would be impossible to remove. 
 
20. Lenders will try to turn their liabilities into “near-
monies”?  
Van Dixhoorn (2013) p.33 put the above “near monies” criticism. 
Answer. Obviously some lenders will try to do that. In fact advocates of 
FR in the 1930s were well aware of that potential problem as are present 
day advocates of FR, Dyson (2013) in particular. 
But dealing with that problem is not difficult. For example it would be 
easy to require that all literature and web sites dealing with non-money 
market mutual funds under Kotlikoff’s FR system to declared in bold type 
something to the effect that “You are not guaranteed  $X back for every 
$X you invest in this fund.” In fact legislation in the UK actually requires 
those selling unit trusts and other stock exchange investments to declare 
something very similar: a sentence to the effect that “the value of these 
investments can fall as well as rise”. 
Second, it can be made illegal to draw checks or do plastic card 
transactions on a stake in a bank which consists nominally of shares. 
Indeed under the FR system advocated by Dyson (2012) and Werner 
(2011), checks and plastic card transactions can only be funded by safe 
accounts. 
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21. Anyone can create money, thus trying to limit money 
creation is futile?  
See Van Dixhoorn (2013) - paragraph starting “The sector will…” p.34). 
Answer. The text book definition of the word money is something like 
“anything widely accepted in payment for goods and services”. 
Now the liabilities of banks are “widely accepted” because they are 
SPECIFICALLY DISIGNED to be easily transferrable. In contrast, it is 
quite untrue to suggest, as Van Dixhoorn does that an ordinary trade 
credit is a form of money. To illustrate, if firm A delivers goods to firm B 
worth $X, B is then indebted to A to the tune of $X. And B could issue an 
IOU in payment. But is that liability (the IOU) likely to be of any use to A 
for the purposes of “paying money” to some third party? It is unlikely. 
Thus an ordinary trade credit just isn't money in a large majority of 
cases. 
The latter form of “IOU” money creation was more common in the 1700s 
and 1800s: the IOUs took the form of bills of exchange. But those are 
rare nowadays. 
But that is not to say that after implementing FR there would be a total 
absence of types of money other than what the average household or 
firm regards as money: what might be called “official” money. In 
particular, in the world’s financial centres various types of debt serve the 
purpose of money: e.g. short term government debt. However for the 
large majority of households and the large majority of firms, particularly 
small and medium size ones, there is only one form of money and that is 
central bank created money and money created by well known 
commercial banks which trades at par with central bank money. 
Local currencies. Another form of money or quasi-money that could 
perfectly well be left in place on implementing FR is local currencies. It’s 
debatable as to how far local currencies constitute money and for the 
following reason. 
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Money is defined in economics dictionaries as something like: “anything 
widely accepted in payment for goods and services”. Now local 
currencies are not “accepted” outside particular localities. Thus they do 
not fulfil the the “widely accepted” criterion. Indeed, they are probably 
not even accepted for the majority of transactions WITHIN the relevant 
areas.  
 
22. Advocates of FR are concerned just with retail 
banking? 
That was claimed by Van Dixhoorn (2013, paragraph starting “Third the 
critics have..” p.34 and Krugman (2014).  
Answer. The above criticism is just nonsense. If those making that 
criticism bothered to read the literature, they would find that advocates of 
FR apply the same rules to investment banks as to retail banks. To 
repeat: that is one of the beauties of FR – it solves several bank related 
problems with a few simple rules.  
 
23. The government and/or central bank will not be better 
than the market at regulating the amount of money? 
That criticism was put by Warner (2014) passage starting “..it takes quite 
a leap to think..”. Coppola (2012) makes the same claim. 
Answer. At the time of writing, we have just been thru a crisis caused by 
a catastrophic failure of private banks to regulate the amount of money / 
loans in a stable manner. Thus the above alleged weakness in FR flies 
in the face of reality. 
Moreover, most of those who make the above criticism seem quite 
happy for government and central bank to regulate aggregate demand, 
and ironically, one way that the authorities do that regulation is (as 
already pointed out) fiscal stimulus plus QE, which amounts to exactly 
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the form of stimulus advocated by most supporters of FR! In short, 
Warner contradicts himself. 
As to Coppola, she tries to substantiate her claim that the committee that 
determined stimulus under FR would not ACCURATELY estimate the 
amount of stimulus correctly by referring to an EXISTING and similar 
committee that seems to be not too good at forecasting. As she puts it 
“The Office of Budget Responsibility's October evaluation report 
admitted that they got their growth forecasts wrong by a full 5 
percentage points.” 
Now it’s a bit odd to criticise a PROPOSED system by pointing to a 
defect in the EXISTING system! If the existing system is so defective, 
that rather suggests something else might be better. At the very least, all 
Coppola’s above criticism amounts to is saying that committees of 
economists are far from perfect when it comes to forecasting. No doubt 
they are, and no doubt members of those committees would be first to 
admit to their imperfections. But that’s not an argument for or against a 
different type of committee. 
 
24. It wasn’t just banks that failed in 2008: also households 
became over-indebted? 
That criticism was put by Krugman (2014). See his paragraph starting 
“Third….”. 
Answer. First, who were those households indebted to? It was banks to 
some extent! If lending entities / banks become more responsible under 
FR because they know there is no taxpayer to pay for the irresponsibility 
when it goes wrong, then that improves things.  
Second, of course it was not JUST BANKS that households were 
indebted to: that is banks sold on mortgages to non-bank entities. Thus 
households were effectively in debt to the latter entities, not to banks. 
And clearly FR does not cut irrational exuberance in that area. But nor 
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does it stop stock exchange irrational exuberance. FR, to repeat, does 
not solve every conceivable economic problem. 
Third, Krugman makes much of the fact that banks recovered relatively 
quickly from the crisis, in contrast to which indebted households took 
much longer to recover (see Krugamn’s chart). Well you bet banks 
recovered quickly: they were the lucky recipients of trillions of dollars of 
public money, loans at favourable rates of interest and so on! It is 
precisely the latter sort of subsidy or distortion that is disposed of under 
FR. 
 
25. Creation of liquidity / money is prevented?  
See Diamond (1986).  
Answer. True, but that is half the object of the exercise. That is, 
advocates of FR claim that just the central bank should create money, 
while commercial banks continue to act as intermediaries between 
borrowers and lenders much as they do at present (with the exception 
that lenders carry all losses when poor loans are made rather than the 
taxpayer carrying those losses as occurs at present).  
As to the arguments against private money creation were spelled out in 
section 1.5 above. 
Finally, one has to wonder how much of a grip on reality Diamond has 
given that the word “subsidy” does not appear in his paper. One of the 
main merits of full reserve is that it disposes of bank subsidies. Plus it is 
widely agreed even by those who DO NOT support FR, that the TBTF 
and other bank subsidies should be disposed of. In short, Diamond, 
either by error or by design, keeps very quiet about a major defect in the 
banking system he advocates. 
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26. Funding via commercial paper would be more 
difficult under FR? 
See Diamond (1986). 
Answer. Loans based on commercial paper are just one form of loan. 
The important question is to work out what is the best banking / lending / 
borrowing system for ALL TYPES OF LENDER AND BORROWER.  
 
27. FR is nearly the same as monetarism? 
See Pettifor (2014).  
Answer. There is a big problem in claiming that a set of ideas in 
economics is similar to or equal to monetarism, as follows. Monetarism 
is at its simplest just the idea that the QUANTITY of money is of some 
relevance: that the quantity of money has some sort of effect. And it is 
pretty obvious that the quantity of money must have SOME SORT OF 
effect. About 95% of economists are agreed on the latter very simple 
and obvious point. 
 Milton Friedman was famous of course for taking that to an extreme: 
claiming that economies can be regulated JUST BY adjusting the 
quantity of money. In fact he went even further and claimed that that 
quantity should be expanded by the same small amount year in year out 
regardless of whether the economy was booming or in a recession. 
Thus to criticise a set of ideas because those ideas are similar to 
monetarism is an almost vacuous accusation unless one is VERY 
SPECIFIC as to what the similarities are. To illustrate, if the accusation 
is simply that the relevant ideas include the above simple assumption 
that the quantity of money has some sort of effect, then that is a non-
accusation because (as just explained) almost everyone agrees that the 
quantity of money has SOME EFFECT. 
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As to Pettifor’s claim that FR equals or is similar to monetarism, her 
accusation falls in the “vacuous” category because she is extremely 
vague on exactly what the similarities are. 
Moreover, advocates of FR (like the majority of economists probably) 
also claim that THE PROCESS OF spending extra money created into 
the economy also has an effect. I.e. they claim fiscal boost has an effect. 
Thus even if the quantity of money has virtually no effect, that does not 
greatly dent or destroy FR. 
 
28. There is no demand for safe or warehouse banks? 
Numerous critics of FR claim there has been no demand throughout 
history for banks which simply lodge money without lending it on and 
thus earning depositors some interest. Thus there would be no demand 
for the safe accounts under FR. For example White (2003) and Van 
Dixhoorn (2013) make that criticism. 
Answer. First, the above contradicts the equally common claim by 
opponents of FR that there’d be a stampede for safe accounts. See 
No.29 just below. 
Second, the claim flies in the face of the facts. That is, most people want 
to spread their risks: e.g. store some of their wealth (liquid and illiquid) in 
very safe forms, while doing something more daring or risky with another 
portion of their wealth. And in fact there are numerous very safe types of 
bank or quasi-bank: there is National Savings and Investments in the UK 
and money market mutual funds in the US.  
It is true that the latter don’t pay a ZERO rate of interest, but the rate 
paid is very low, reflecting the safe nature of investments made. Thus 
there would presumably be a finite demand for an account which 
involved even greater safety and paid an even lower rate. 
Moreover, to the extent that there IS A LIMITED demand for warehouse 
banking since WWII, that is hardly surprising. Reason is that taxpayer 
funded backing for conventional banks enables ordinary depositors to 
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enjoy total safety while getting interest. Why go for an account that pays 
no interest when you can get interest gratis the taxpayer?  
 
29. FR would cause a stampede to safe accounts? 
I.e. few existing depositors would want their stake in their bank to be 
effectively converted to a shareholding, a claim made by Dowd (2014). 
Answer. The reality is that shareholders (in corporations in general 
rather than specifically in banks) do not demand a particularly high rate 
of return compared to depositors or bond-holders. 
Moreover, the above claim by Dowd contradicts the claim made by 
several opponents of FR, namely that there’d be no demand for safe 
accounts  - see No.28 just above. 
 
30. FR would raise the cost of funding banks? 
That is, it might seem that the cost of funding banks rises because 
shareholders demand a bigger return on their investment than 
depositors. Thus if the proportion of bank funding that comes from 
shares as opposed to deposits is increased then the cost of funding 
banks would seem to rise. 
Answer. The flaw in the above argument was set out by Franco 
Modigliani and Merton Miller. As they pointed out, the risks involved in 
running a bank which performs a given set of activities is a GIVEN. Thus 
the price charged by those covering the risk involved is also a given. 
Thus increasing the number of people who cover that risk, or increasing 
the proportion of bank funding that comes from shares rather than 
deposits and similar has no effect on the total charge that shareholders 
make for covering the risk. 
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But FR does raise the cost of funding banks in that bank subsidies are 
removed. However removing subsidies ought to INCREASE GDP not 
REDUCE it. 
 
31. Fractional reserve is not fraudulent? 
White (2003) claimed that fractional reserve (i.e. the existing banking 
system is not fraudulent. (Incidentally the phrase “fractional reserve” is a 
bit of a misnomer as is “full reserve” (as explained above) but it is a 
phrase that has established itself.) 
Answer. The first problem there is that White in the latter work doesn’t 
say what the alleged fraud actually is. Instead, he refers readers on his 
first page to about ten books and articles which apparently set out the 
fraud. It is thus impossible to know what fraud or alleged fraud White 
refers to. 
Second, given the number of works he cites that apparently set out the 
fraud, it’s unlikely those works all agree with each other. Indeed, there 
are several popular “fraud” charges made against fractional reserve 
which are clearly invalid. 
However, White’s central point is that for fraud to exist, someone must 
be duped, and the large majority of bank customers do not regard 
themselves as having being duped. 
The flaw in that argument is that there are all degrees of “duping” from 
slight misrepresentation to serious and carefully thought out fraud. And 
the extent of misrepresentation doubtless varies depending on the fraud 
charges involved. 
However, as a second best, let us consider White’s arguments as they 
relate a “fraud” charge against fractional reserve which does have some 
substance, and which is as follows. 
A fractional reserve bank promises to return to depositors and 
bondholders the exact sum deposited (maybe plus interest and maybe 
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less bank charges). But of course the flaw or fraud there is that the 
money is loaned on or invested by the bank and that involves the risk 
that the loans or investments go bad. And sure as night follows day, 
once every twenty or thirty years the loans do go wrong, and one or 
more large banks can’t repay all the money they owe depositors. And as 
to small banks in the US, they go bust at the rate of about one a week. 
So how much fraud or misrepresentation takes place there? Well 
commercial banks certainly do not advertising the fact that there is a one 
in twenty chance that depositors and similar bank creditors will lose their 
money! Quite the reverse: their publicity normally stresses the safety of 
the relevant bank. So there is certainly AN ELEMENT of fraud there. 
Of course the contract governing an account at a typical bank, the small 
print in particular, may say something different. But that’s near irrelevant. 
The typical bank customer does not read the small print - and probably 
wouldn’t understand it if they did. It is thus indisputable that banks are 
guilty of a certain amount of misrepresentation or to put it more strongly 
– “fraud” and “duping”. 
The actual degree of fraud perpetrated by fractional reserve banks 
actually depends on their capital ratios. To illustrate, capital ratios of 
about 3% were common before the recent crisis. In that scenario, a bank 
effectively declares that it will not go technically or actually insolvent 
because there is a minimal chance of its assets falling in value by more 
than about 3%, a claim which is clearly absurd and blatantly fraudulent. 
However, the higher the capital ratio, the less the fraud until one reaches 
the 100% ratio. But that is FR pure and simple and totally fraud free! 
 
32. FR will not stop boom and bust? 
Turner (2010, p.45-6) the above criticism. As he put it in relation to 
Kotlikoff’s non money market mutual funds: 
“…investors would be likely in the upswing to consider their investments 
as safe as bank deposits. Investments in loan funds would therefore be 
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likely to grow in a pro-cyclical fashion when valuations were on an 
upswing and then to run when valuations and confidence fell, creating 
credit booms and busts potentially as severe as in past bank-based 
crises.”  
Answer. The advocates of FR do not claim that FR will totally eliminate 
all instabilities. Nothing will ever totally eliminate bouts of irrational 
exuberance or the opposite. 
However, there is a fundamental difference between FR and the existing 
system. Under FR, all lenders essentially become shareholders, and it is 
virtually impossible for banks / lending entities under FR to go insolvent.  
And as two former central bank governors, King (2010) and Greenspan 
(2014) pointed out, a fall in share values causes minimal disturbance as 
compared to banks going insolvent. As King put it, 
“…we saw in 1987 and again in the early 2000s, that a sharp fall in 
equity values did not cause the same damage as did the banking crisis. 
Equity markets provide a natural safety valve, and when they suffer 
sharp falls, economic policy can respond. But when the banking system 
failed in September 2008, not even massive injections of both liquidity 
and capital by the state could prevent a devastating collapse of 
confidence and output around the world.” 
Or as Greenspan put it: 
“All bubbles expand, and they all collapse. But how they are financed is 
critical. The dot-com boom [of 1994 to 2000] produced a huge financial 
collapse with almost no evidence of economic impact.” 
Of course, a decline in large swathes of stock market shares is not the 
same thing as a decline just in shares in lending entities. Nevertheless, 
there is a big difference between, first, a system that results in lending 
entities closing their doors given problems, and two, a system that 
simply results in shares in such entities declining. The first scenario is 
clearly the more serious. 
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33. Bank shareholders will demand a high return to reflect 
their uncertainty about what a bank actually does? 
I.e. bank management knows more about its bank that shareholders or 
potential shareholders, thus the latter will want insurance against 
possibly being misinformed by bank management, thus equity is an 
inherently expensive way of funding banks, a claim made by Elliot 
(2013). 
Answer. Depositors and bond-holders who fund banks suffer from 
EXACTLY THE SAME asymmetric information problem. Thus Elliot’s 
point is not an argument for reducing or increasing capital ratios.  
 
34. FR reduces commercial bank flexibility? 
The idea that under FR, individual banks are constrained by the need to 
find savers before they can lend was shown to be flawed in section 1.12 
above.  
As distinct from INDIVIDUAL banks, there is the possibility that FR 
constrains the ability of the commercia bank system AS A WHOLE to 
expand the aggregate amount loaned. Well perhaps FR does have that 
effect, but that’s not entrely unwelcomed given that fact that in the UK, 
commercial bank loans / money expanded at a rapid rate in the three 
years or so just prior to the crises. And that resulted in a boom followed 
by a bust. 
Then, as always happens in busts, commercial banks did exactly what 
we do not want them to do, i.e. put the whole process into reverse: they 
called in loans, etc. In short, the commercial bank system 
EXACERBATES the boom bust cycle. 
To summarise, when there is a faster than usual expansion in the 
amount of commercial bank lending, that’s probably a sign of a boom or 
bubble. In contrast, if the money supply is under the control of the 
central bank, it can expand the money supply in a way desiged to be in 
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the best interests of the country as a whole: i.e. in accordance with what 
inflation and unemployment are doing.  
Moreover, opponents of FR (i.e. defenders of the existing banking 
system) are perfectly happy for central banks and governments to try 
and control the boom / bust cycle via interest rate adjustments, 
quantitative easing and so on, and the latter necessarily involves 
influencing the amount of commercial bank lending. Those opponents of 
FR thus need to explain why they object so much to commercial bank 
lending being controlled in a slightly different way, as occurs under FR. 
 
35. FR would not stop bank runs? 
I.e. given suspicions about a lending entity, it’s shares might be dumped 
in the same way as depositors withdraw their money en masse from a 
traditional bank about which there are suspicions. 
Answer. No. There is an important difference between a traditional bank 
and an entity funded just by shares. In the case of the former, a run can 
and does quickly lead to insolvency. In the case of the latter, insolvency 
is virtually impossible. As Cochrane (2013) put it, “the financial system 
needs to be reformed so that it is not prone to runs.” 
 
36. Vickers’s flawed criticisms of FR. 
The BASIC flaws in the ideas put by Vickers (2011) were set out in 
Section 1.13 above. In contrast, this section runs through Vickers’s 
criticisms of FR (which are in Vickers’s paragraphs 3.20 to 3.24). 
Section 3.20. 
This starts: 
“Proponents of a different kind of structural reform known as ‘narrow 
banking’ (Kay (2009)) argue that the function of taking deposits and 
providing payments services to individuals and SMEs is so critical to the 
~ 62 ~ 
 
economy that it should not be combined with risky assets. Under a strict 
form of narrow banking the only assets allowed to be held against such 
deposits would be safe, liquid assets.” 
There two problems with that passage, as follows. 
First, the passage refers to “narrow” banking which amounts to the same 
thing as the safe accounts offered by FR. But a few paragraphs later 
(3.22) Vickers refers to “limited purpose banking” which they say “offers 
an alternative solution, under which the role of financial intermediaries is 
to bring together savers and borrowers but risk is eliminated from the 
intermediary because it does not hold the loan on its books. All of the 
risk of the loan is passed onto the investors…”. 
But “limited purpose banking” comes to the same thing as the 
lending/investing half of the bank industry under FR. Moreover, if the law 
says that those wanting total safety must put their money into an 
account where funds are not loaned on, then it follows that lending must 
be and will be done by entities of the “lending/investing” type (funded by 
shareholders). Thus to describe limited purpose banking as an 
“alternative solution” as Vickers does, is wrong. 
That is, the reality is that narrow banking and limited purpose banking 
are necessarily and logically all part of the same system, which is 
commonly referred to as “full reserve” or “100% reserve” banking. 
Second, and regarding Vickers’s reference to Kay (2009), John Kay 
actually contradicts himself. He does initially say “The model of narrow 
banking is one in which all retail deposits are secured on safe assets.” 
But then on his p.52 he says “Narrow banks might engage in consumer 
lending, lend on mortgage, and lend to businesses, but would not enjoy 
a monopoly of these functions.” 
That’s an absolutely fundamental self-contradiction. So this looks like a 
case of the blind leading the blind. But never mind: let’s run with Kay’s 
first or initial ideas as to what narrow banking consists of (as per 
Vickers). Vickers continues: 
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“Since lending to the private sector necessarily involves risk, such banks 
would not be able to use the funding from deposits to make loans to 
individuals and SMEs. Should ring-fenced banks be allowed to make 
such loans? If ring-fenced banks were not able to perform their core 
economic function of intermediating between deposits and loans, the 
economic costs would be very high.” 
“Very high”? Where do they get that from? Well here’s a clue. On the 
subject of “very high”, Vickers’s so called “Interim Report” said 
something very similar to their “Final Report”. The interim report actually 
said “Like narrow banking, a complete move from fractional to full 
reserve banking would drastically curtail the lending capacity of the UK 
banking system, reducing the amount of credit available to households 
and businesses and destroying intermediation synergies.” 
But according to Dyson (2012, p.267), “In response to requests, the 
commission would not clarify what they meant by “drastic””. 
In short, and as far as those phrases “very high” and “drastic” go, it very 
much looks as though Vickers is making it up as it goes along. 
But never mind. It’s not too difficult to come up with some more 
intelligent ideas here than Vickers managed as regards the effect of full 
reserve banking on “…the amount of credit available to households and 
businesses”. 
Under full reserve, those funding businesses and mortgages have to 
bear the full cost of what they do, as distinct from the existing system 
under which taxpayers bear the ultimate risk involved in that funding or 
lending. And that’s the main difference between the existing system and 
full reserve. 
Thus full reserve DOES INVOLVE increased costs for borrowers, BUT 
ONLY TO THE EXTENT of removing the above taxpayer funded 
subsidy. Moreover, Vickers’s two reports (interim and final) just like 
Dodd-Frank clearly state that subsidies are undesirable. 
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So Vickers advocates the removal of bank subsidies at the same time as 
objecting to a system which actually removes those subsidies! It very 
much looks as though Vickers is in check mate there. 
 
The rest of section 3.21. 
The rest of this section does not add much to the above points, though 
the final two sentences of this section are worth examining. The first 
says: 
“Either way, narrow banking would mean that ring-fenced banks could 
not be a source of stable credit supply during times of stress”. 
Now there is a definitial problem there, namely that Vickers proposes 
splitting the bank industry into two halves one way, and full reserve 
proposes splitting it another. Thus using the phrase “ringfence” when 
considering full reserve is not entirely logical. However, let’s assume that 
“ring-fenced banks” means banks which concentrate on the retail and 
small firm sectors (and doubtless such banks or lending entities would 
arise under FR). 
The advocates of FR and Vickers are agreed that it is important for 
households and small firms to be able to pay each other given problems 
with the investment or casino section of the banking system. But full 
reserve achieves that by making TOTALLY safe accounts available. In 
contrast, Vickers’s supposedly safe “ring fenced” sector of the banking 
industry is NOT TOTALLY SAFE because it lends out money in a less 
than 100% safe fashion. Thus Vickers’s claim just above that full 
reserve’s equivalent of ring fenced banks “could not be a source of 
stable credit supply during times of stress” is very questionable if not 
pure nonsense: FR’s safe accounts are SAFER THAN Vickers’s 
equivalent. 
As to why retail lending entities under FR would not be a “source of 
stable credit” Vickers does not explain. Certainly there is no reason to 
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suppose there’d be any wild gyrations in the total amount that investor / 
depositors want to have loaned on to mortgagors, businesses and so on. 
Moreover, the EXISTING BANKING SYSTEM is a hundred miles from 
offering a “stable source of credit” to potential borrowers. As explained 
above, under the existing system the amount of bank credit varies 
greatly depending on whether the economy is in boom or bust mode. 
And also as explained above, booms and busts ought to less severe 
under FR. So to that extent, the amount of credit available under FR 
ought to be MORE STABLE than under the existing system. 
 
The last sentence of 3.21. 
In the last sentence of this section Vickers says: 
“Instead, the supply of credit would move entirely to a less regulated 
sector.”   
The answer to that point was spelled out in section 2.15 above, the 
answer being briefly that it is nonsense to have a regulated and non-
regulated banking sector. That is ANY ENTITY involved in lending 
should abide by the same rules (regardless, incidentally, of whether FR 
is implemented or not). 
 
Section 3.22. 
This section starts: 
“Limited purpose banking offers an alternative solution, under which the 
role of financial intermediaries is to bring together savers and borrowers 
but risk is eliminated from the intermediary because it does not hold the 
loan on its books. All of the risk of the loan is passed onto the investors 
in the intermediary (or fund), so that effectively all debt is securitised. 
However, limited purpose banking would severely constrain two key 
functions of the financial system. First, it would constrain banks’ ability to 
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produce liquidity through the creation of liabilities (deposits) with shorter 
maturities than their assets. The existence of such deposits allows 
households and firms to settle payments easily.”  
Well the answer to that “constrain” point was spelled out in section 1.5 
above. Briefly the answer is that the arguments for having commercial 
banks create a form of money just do not stand inspection.  
As for the idea that “existence of such deposits allows households and 
firms to settle payments easily”, what’s the relevance of that point? 
Vickers seems to suggest that under FR “households and firms” wouldn’t 
have a method of “settling payments easily” which is of course 
nonsense: under FT, “households and firms” have current or checking 
accounts just as under the existing system. 
 
Monitoring borrowers. 
Vickers continues: 
“Second, banks would no longer be incentivised to monitor their 
borrowers, and it would be more difficult to modify loan agreements. 
These activities help to maximise the economic value of bank loans.”  
“No longer incentivised to monitor”? What on Earth is Vickers on about? 
It’s under the EXISTING SYSTEM that there is a lack of “incentive to 
monitor” because lenders know that taxpayers stand behind them!! And 
Vickers fails to dispose of that taxpayer backing or subsidy for the bank 
industry! 
As to the idea that it would be “difficult to modify loan agreements”, the 
logic there will probably elude most readers, if not all of them. Under full 
reserve, lenders and borrowers are free to set up loan agreements in 
any way they want, as long as it is not illegal. If lenders want to insist 
that borrowers drink whiskey rather than gin (to take a silly example), 
contracting parties are entirely free under the law of most countries to 
include that condition in loan agreements under both the existing system 
and under full reserve. And if they want to “modify” the amount of whisky 
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drinking involved in the loan, that’s entirely up to the contracting parties. 
Same goes for “modifying loan agreements”. 
 
Section 3.23. 
This section starts with a reference to Vickers’s “ring fence” proposal: 
that’s the idea that risky or investment banking be separated from retail 
banking.   
“The ring-fence proposal shares the recognition that continuous 
provision of deposit taking services is important to the economy, but not 
the conclusion that the providers of such services must therefore be 
made virtually riskless. The role banks play in intermediation is an 
important one, and lending necessarily involves risk. So some risk of 
failure should be tolerated but it must be possible for the authorities to 
ensure continuous provision of vital services without taxpayer support for 
the creditors of a failed provider.”  
Pray how does Vickers propose combining a “risk of failure” with an 
absence of “taxpayer support of the creditors of a failed provider”? That 
is a straight self-contradiction.  That is, in the event of a “provider failing”, 
Vickers does not want creditors (especially depositors) to foot the bill, 
nor does Vickers want taxpayers to foot the bill. 
SO WHO DOES FOOT THE BILL? Vickers doesn’t tell us! 
Vickers continues: 
“Equally, the importance of intermediation means that it should not be 
combined with other risky activities which are not an inherent part of 
intermediation.”   
But Vickers just said in the previous sentence that intermediators should 
be involved in “some risk of failure”. To put it mildly, there is some 
muddled thinking here. 
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Section 3.24. 
This starts: 
“The debate about narrow banking provides two important insights into 
the appropriate design of a retail ring-fence: 
 • services which are not integral to the direct intermediation of funds or 
the provision of payments services should not be provided by ring-
fenced banks….” 
Now wait a moment. Investment banks do carry out “intermediation”! 
The conclusion has to be that the BASIC IDEA behind the Vickers 
proposals is a mess. Of course it can be made to work given a HUGE 
NUMBER of associated or complementary rules and regulations. But 
that is not the point. The important point is that FR is simplicity itself. In 
contrast, Vickers is “complexity itself”, which is exactly what the smart 
lawyers working for banks want. 
 
37. Regulating loans is better than FR? 
I.e. an obvious way to make banks safer is to impose more stringent 
regulations on lenders for example insisting on minimum equity stakes 
for mortgagors (i.e. insisting on maximum loan to value ratios for 
mortgagors). And that is an alternative, if not a better option than FR. 
Answer. The first problem there is that that is relatively easy to do in the 
case of mortgages, but not in the case of loans to businesses. For 
example some bank managers, quite rightly, lend to particular 
businesses because they know the relevant business proprietors and 
know the latter to be competent. Setting up rules and regulations to cater 
for those elusive characteristics of business proprietors is impossible. 
Second, even if it were possible to forbid the making of risky loans, it is 
hard to see the case for doing so where lender and borrower now what 
they are doing, and assuming there are no harmful systemic 
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consequences when a significant proportion of those loans go wrong. 
And the latter is exactly what FR achieves because when a significant 
number of loans go wrong, lending entities do not become insolvent: all 
that happens is that shares in lending entities decline in value. 
Moreover, under FR, those who fund loans are free to have their money 
loaned on in whatever way they want: if they really want to fund NINJA 
mortgages, they are free to do so. Free markets and capitalism are all 
about taking risks: sometimes small risks and sometimes big risks. If big 
risks had been banned over the last three hundred years, the industrial 
revolution would never have taken place. 
In short, regulating loans achieves stability by cutting down on flexibility. 
In contrast, under FR, stability is achieved without reducing flexibility. 
 
38. FR doesn’t insure against liquidity shocks? 
Bossone (2002) claimed: “An important strand of research, following 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), stress the role of banks as insurers against 
liquidity shocks.” 
Answer. Some readers may fall about laughing at that claim, reason 
being that it was the banking system ITSELF which around 2005 was 
the MAJOR CAUSE OF a “liquidity shock”. It was TAXPAYERS who 
provided TRILLIONS OF DOLLARS of “insurance money” to deal with 
the “liquidity shock”. 
In fact Bossone seems to be very much in awe of the responsible and 
prudent behaviour of banks when he claims “This crucial link between 
liquidity and production is explicitly recognized in Diamond and Rajan 
(1998, 1999), where banks are regarded as superior devices to tie 
human capital with real (illiquid) assets, and where the sequential 
service constraint ordering the way in which banks service withdrawal 
demands (up to when they become illiquid) work as an incentive for 
bankers to behave prudently.” 
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So bankers behave “prudently” under the existing system do they? The 
reality is that they were responsible for the worst crash since 1929. 
Moreover, to judge by the multi billion dollar fines paid by banks around 
2013-14 for various crimes and misdeeds, it would be reasonable to say 
that banks are the biggest criminal organisations in the Western world. 
In short, the word “prudent” in this connection is a joke. 
 
39. Government couldn’t produce enough money under 
FR? 
That claim was made by Wray (2014). See paragraph starting “While our 
governments are large, they are not big enough to provide all the 
monetary IOUs we need….” 
Answer. That contradicts the claim rightly made by Wray and other 
advocates of MMT, namely that there is NO LIMIT to the amount of 
money that government can print and spend. Robert Mugabe illustrated 
that point. 
In short, privately produced money is just not necessary. 
 
40. FR prevents all lending? 
The above bizarre claim is made by De Anglo (2014) and Bossone 
(2002). 
Answer. Some critics of FR are under the illusion that because FR gives 
depositors the option of totally safe deposits with relevant sums simply 
being lodged at the central bank, that therefor no lending takes place 
under FR. De Angelo (2014) is an example of a paper which (despite all 
the impressive maths in the paper) makes the latter very elementary 
blunder. 
The notion that under FR, no one can borrow is also trotted out by 
Bossone. 
~ 71 ~ 
 
Bossone’s next criticism is thus. (Incidentally notice the near 
incomprehensible English – much loved by academics). 
“In a setting where all individuals are initially identical but learn only 
subsequently to have different intertemporal consumption preferences, 
banks are shown to generate liquidity to help individuals who discover to 
be “patient” consumers to satisfy their needs. They do so by 
transforming illiquid assets into liquid deposits. This is possible because 
the averaging out of the withdrawal demands from a large number of 
depositors allows banks to stabilize their deposit base and transfer 
deposit ownership without liquidating the assets. From this angle, the 
social benefit of banking derives from an improvement in risk-sharing, 
i.e., the increased flexibility of those who have an urgent need to 
withdraw their funds before the assets mature (Diamond and Dybvig 
1986).” 
Now what makes Bossone think that under FR households and firms 
can’t borrow, as the above passage implies? The only difference 
between the existing system and FR is that under the latter, lending is 
carried out by “banks” or “entities” that are funded just by shareholders, 
as opposed to the existing system under which lenders are funded 
mainly by depositors. Indeed, as Bossone himself put it a page or two 
earlier: 
“Commercial banks having to switch to narrow-banking regulation could 
be expected to transfer their credit exposures to existing or newly-
established finance companies, which typically operate with higher 
capital ratios and fund themselves with relatively larger volumes of long-
term debt.” 
Bossone then repeats the above error (i.e. assuming that no one can 
borrow under FR) when he says:  
 “In fact, the benefit of banking cannot be fully appreciated if the asset 
and the liability side of the bank balance sheet are not considered 
connectedly. The benefit derives from the banks using their stable 
deposit base to finance production technologies that increase output 
over time.”   
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To repeat, under FR, (if we have to use pseudo technical phrases) 
“production technologies” can be “financed over time” perfectly well 
under FR. 
 
41. Banks will try to circumvent FR rules? 
Answer. It is 100% certain that banks would try every trick in the book to 
circumvent the rules of FR. But then it’s a 100% certain they’ll try to 
circumvent ANY RULES or laws. Banks are quasi criminal organisations. 
The total fines that have been imposed on banks in the US in connection 
with sundry crimes committed during and before the crisis is in the order 
of $100bn at the time of writing (yes, that’s billion, not million).  
But to repeat, at least the rules of full reserve are simple. So to that 
extent they are easy to enforce. 
 
42. Converting to FR involves a huge bailout of existing 
banks? 
Coppola (2012) made the above claim: indeed the title of her article is 
“Full reserve banking: the largest bank bailout in history.” 
Answer. The first and obvious flaw in that argument is that the 
EXISTING BANKING SYSTEM had to be bailed out with trillions of 
dollars of public money in the crisis or recession which began around 
2007. Thus supporters of the existing system are not in a position to 
preach sermons on “bailouts” to advocates of FR. 
A second flaw is that Friedman (1960) advocated FR, and as a staunch 
advocate of free markets, it is highly unlikely he would have advocated 
FR had he thought that any sort of “bailout” for private banks was 
involved.  
Incidentally, and as mentioned above, Friedman saw little difficulty in 
converting to FR. As he put it, “There is no technical problem in 
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achieving a transition from our present system to 100% reserves easily, 
fairly speedily and without any serious repercussions on financial or 
economic markets.”  
As to Friedman’s use of the word “speedily” he was right to say that the 
conversion could be done more or less overnight. But to minimise 
disruption it might well be desirable to convert over a period of months or 
years. However the BASIC PRINCIPLES involved in both a quick and 
slow conversion are the same, so it does not matter whether we use a 
“quick” or “slow” conversion to illustrate the basic principles. But to keep 
things simple, the quick option is better. So here goes. 
A bailout free conversion. Government announces that by a particular 
point in time, all depositors must allocate their money as between sums 
they want to be totally safe, and sums they are prepared to put at risk 
with a view to earning interest (or more interest than is obtainable on the 
latter totally safe money). 
As regards the latter “risk” money, all that is required is to change the 
description of the money involved. That is, risk money is classified as 
“stake in a mutual fund” if we adopt Kotlikoff’s version of full reserve. Or 
in the case of PM’s system, that money becomes “money in investment 
accounts”. No bailout or anything that faintly resembles a bailout there. 
 
Safe money. 
As to money that depositors want to be totally safe, the central bank 
would need to create and effectively credit those depositors with $X of 
central bank money for every $X of existing money that those depositors 
had in commercial banks and which they wanted to be totally safe. And 
that would be a huge gift to or “bailout” for commercial banks if that was 
the end of the story. As Coppola put it: 
“Under full reserve banking, all banks would have to hold enough funds 
to allow all sight deposits to be drawn at once. To achieve this, central 
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banks would have to produce a simply ginormous amount of new 
money: the IMF estimates that for the US, it would be 184% of GDP.”  
But that is NOT THE END of the story. 
What about the loans corresponding to that money? Well that then 
becomes the property of the central bank. That is, the central bank 
collects the repayment of capital and interest on those loans till the loans 
expire. (Incidentally it could easily make sense for commercial banks to 
collect those repayments of capital and interest ON BEHALF OF the 
central bank. But that’s an administrative detail.) 
Coppola evidently didn’t grasp the above, that is the fact that in 
exchange for £Xbn new money, commercial banks simply transfer £Xbn 
of their assets to the central bank. As she put it: 
“Positive Money would no doubt say that as their proposal involves 
moving transaction accounts from private bank to central bank books, no 
new money needs to be created. I disagree. In order to move the 
transaction accounts, the central bank would have to create new 
reserves to the value of the total balances in those accounts. This is 
simply a consequence of double entry accounting: it is not possible 
simply to eliminate deposit balances from private bank balance sheets 
without also writing off the debt assets that currently back them. So 
either the central bank must produce new money, or there must be a 
debt jubilee. (The IMF noticed this and opted for the debt jubilee, but 
their accounting was wrong and they didn't consider the inflation 
consequences of such a massive debt write-off).” 
“The IMF” in the latter sentence is a reference to Kumhof (2012). In 
short, Kumhof made the same mistake as Coppola: neither could see a 
way of creating the $Xbn of new base money without EITHER making 
an £$bn gift to commercial banks, OR writing off £$bn of debts owed to 
commercial banks.  
Of course both Coppola and Kumhof are wrong: there is a simple 
solution to the latter problem, which to repeat, is to transfer $Xbn of 
commercial bank assets to the central bank. 
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Small elements of bailout. 
There is however a small element of potential bailout if the central bank 
were to carry any losses arising from repayment of those loans. One 
possibility there is to simply accept those possible bailout costs as part 
of the cost for the country as a whole of converting to full reserve. 
A second possibility is to get the private sector to insure the central bank 
against loss. There are always willing buyers of junk bonds and other 
assets of questionable value. 
But it’s unlikely that the loss would amount to anything more than a very 
small proportion of the total of such loans in the case of standard British 
mortgages. And that accounts for the large majority of lending by banks 
in the UK. 
Moreover, it’s near impossible to get the price exactly right when 
organising a big transfer of assets between public and private sectors or 
when doing any other type of share offering. For example, with the 
benefit of hindsight it is now clear that the UK’s Post Office was sold to 
the private sector in 2014 for significantly below a realistic price - £3.6bn 
too low according to Bloodworth (2014). 
 
43. The Money Creation Committee would not regulate 
demand accurately? 
Claimed by Pettifor (2014). 
Answer. In a non-FR regime (e.g. the existing system) there is inevitably 
SOME SORT of committee that takes decisions on stimulus. For 
example in the UK there is the Bank of England Monetary Policy 
Committee. Thus the above criticism is no more a criticism of FR / MCCs 
than of existing and similar committees (whose members are doubtless 
the first to admit that their economic forecasts are well short of 100% 
accurate.) 
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44. Interest rate gyrations would be larger under FR? 
It is possible that such gyrations WOULD BE larger in some 
circumstances, but that is not an argument against those gyrations, and 
for the following reasons. 
Suppose there is an outbreak of irrational exuberance in the lending / 
borrowing / investment section of the economy, but that that is countered 
by a decline in consumer spending. And let us assume the increase in 
lending is driven by an increased desire to borrow, rather than an  
increased willingness by lenders to lend. Indeed it is arguable that 
something of that sort preceded the recent crisis. That is, it is undeniable 
that borrowing increased significantly, while there was no dramatic rise 
in inflation, thus the extra demand stemming from that extra borrowing 
may have been countered, at least to some extent, by a decline in 
consumer spending, or in some countries, a decline in exports. 
So on balance there is no increase in demand, so the central bank 
leaves interest rates alone. But that is not a desperately clever thing to 
do given that the investment frenzy my cause an asset price bubble  
(which certainly occurred before the recent crisis) 
Moreover, in a perfectly functioning free market, and given the above 
“investment exuberance countered by less consumer spending”, the 
result would be a rise in interest rates, which would stem the demand 
emanating from the increased borrowing. But that would result in 
inadequate aggregate demand, given the above decline in consumer 
spending and/or exports. However in a perfectly functioning free market, 
the market’s cure for inadequate demand would come to the rescue 
(Say’s law and/or the Pigou effect, which of course do not work well in 
the real world). “Say and Pigou” would bring about a general rise in 
spending, including consumer spending. 
Indeed, the inability of the authorities to get the combination of interest 
rate adjustment and fiscal stimulus right under the existing system was 
nicely illustrate in Sweden recently. Sweden tried to moderate an asset 
price bubble by raising interest rates, only to discover that that led to 
inadequate aggregate demand. See Duxbury (2014). 
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To summarise so far, the latter hypothetical perfect free market scenario 
is clearly better than a scenario where a central bank allows interest 
rates to stay relatively low despite an investment boom / asset price 
bubble. 
And what do you know? The latter free market type scenario is 
approximately what an FR regime would bring about. That is, given an 
increased desire to borrow, interest rates would rise, which would 
moderate the investment / borrowing surge. But that would leave the 
country with inadequate aggregate demand because of the reduced 
consumer spending / exports. And under FR, the latter problem would 
be solved by creating and spending extra base money into the economy. 
The conclusion is that at least in some circumstances (and possibly the 
circumstances leading up the recent crisis), FR, despite the interest rate 
gyrations it brings about, produces a better solution that the “solution” (or 
perhaps one should say “disaster”)  we saw at the start of the recent 
crisis. 
_______ 
 
Section 3: Flawed arguments FOR full reserve. 
 
1. We pay interest on privately created money therefor 
base money is better. 
Answer. This is a complicated issue. The next paragraph below 
summarises the arguments against the above “base money is better” 
idea, and that is followed by a more detailed explanation of the point. 
We certainly pay interest on LOANS, whether the loan comes thanks to 
a bank or not. As to where BANKS grant loans, that tends not to create 
money because a loan of $X granted by a bank tends to be matched by 
deposit/s worth $X, and the latter depositors tend to place their money in 
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term accounts which in turn tend not to be counted as money (except to 
the extent that banks engage in maturity transformation). In contrast, 
where a bank so-called “loan” is aimed simply at providing a so called 
“borrower” with day to day transaction money, no actual loan takes 
place, though the bank will certainly charge for ADMINISTRATION 
costs, and will in all probability CALL that charge “interest”. 
Now for a more detailed explanation of that point. 
To illustrate the difference between a bank granting a long term loan and 
supplying a customer with day to day transaction money, let’s imagine 
that commercial banks set up in what has hitherto been a barter 
economy, and the banks offer some wondrous new stuff called “money” 
which disposes of the inefficiencies of barter. (Incidentally “transaction” 
money in the case of a business is part of the business’s so called 
“working capital”). 
Citizens open accounts and offer collateral so as to enable their 
accounts to be credited. And let’s assume initially that citizens only want 
enough money for day to day transactions: i.e. no long term loans are 
involved. 
Now clearly the bank will charge for administration costs (e.g. checking 
up on the value of collateral). But there is no reason for the bank to 
charge interest. 
Interest is a charge made by a lender for the pain or inconvenience of 
foregoing consumption (i.e. saving) so that the borrower CAN 
CONSUME, or “spend”. And in creating money out of thin air in our 
hypothetical economy, the bank has not foregone consumption, and nor 
has anyone else, so there is no reason to charge interest. 
But of course that’s not to say that if you get a loan just to give you 
enough for day to day transactions from a bank that you won’t be 
charged what the bank CALLS interest. The point is that IN REALITY, 
that charge is for administration costs: it is not genuine interest. 
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 Money creation involves debt creation? 
Note also, that where a commercial bank creates just transaction 
money, no real debt is created. To be more exact, a couple of equal and 
opposite debts are created (plus a third debt if collateral is deposited). 
That is, when a bank customer induces a bank to credit $Y to the 
customer’s account, that $Y is a debt owed by the bank to the customer 
and the customer can force the bank to owe some of that money to 
whoever the customer chooses using their cheque book or debit card. 
But at the same time, the customer, as part of the agreement with their 
bank undertakes to repay the $Y to the bank at some stage. So there 
are two equal and opposite debts there. Moreover, if the customer 
deposits collateral at the bank, then the bank owes that to the customer 
when the $Y is eventually repaid.  
Conclusion so far. Far from money creation by commercial banks 
involving customers becoming indebted to a bank, there is no net debt 
either way at the moment the money is created where no collateral is 
deposited. As to where collateral IS DEPOSITED, the bank is actually in 
debt to the customer. Obviously once the customer starts to spend the 
transaction money, the customers debt to the bank rises, or where 
collateral has been deposited, the bank’s total or net debt to the 
customer falls. 
Next let us assume that nearly everyone in our hypothetical economy 
has got themselves some transaction money and we’ll assume everyone 
has an income of some sort (e.g. from work or benefits), the balance on 
the average customer’s bank account will not actually fall at all when the 
spending starts: what WILL HAPPEN is that the balance bobs up and 
down. Obviously it rises when for example the monthly salary cheque 
arrives, and falls for the rest of the month. 
The reason for that is that where one person spends, the relevant 
money must end up in someone else’s bank account. (Incidentally 
PHYSICAL CASH has been ignored in the above argument, but physical 
cash forms a very small proportion of the money supply nowadays, so 
that simplifying assumption is more or less justified.) 
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Conclusion:  when it comes to TRANSACTION money, bank customers 
pay for ADMINISTRATION COSTS, but they do not pay genuine 
INTEREST. 
 
Long term loans. 
As distinct from supplying transaction money, banks also intermediate 
between borrowers and lender/savers. 
Borrowers don’t get loans just to sit a home admiring their newly 
acquired pile of money: they get loans in order to spend, i.e. consume 
the fruits of other peoples’ labour. 
Now the only way to induce anyone to abstain from consumption is for 
the bank to offer interest to depositors. If interest is offered, then some 
people will leave more in their bank accounts than they otherwise would. 
And clearly the bank will have to pass that interest on to borrowers. 
In short, banks do not charge interest simply for creating money. But 
they WILL CHARGE long term borrowers interest, because for every 
long term loan, there has to be someone making a long term deposit (or 
a series of people making longish term deposits).  
The latter point is not correct in that banks engage in maturity 
transformation, but that does not greatly detract from the latter point. 
That is, maturity transformation simply consists of banks lending on 
money they know perfectly well will not be spent in the next week or 
month or whatever. And the latter money is a “long term deposit” of a 
sort. Put another way, where sums are left unused for an extended 
period in current or checking accounts, that money is effectively a long 
term loan to a bank rather than money. 
Moreover, anyone leaving money in a bank for an extended, if they have 
any sense, will put the money in a term account, and money in term 
accounts tends not to be counted as money, though that depends of 
course on the length of the “term”, i.e. how quickly the customer can get 
access to their money. 
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Conclusion. Where banks supply genuine money, that is transaction 
money, no interest is charged. While as regards long term loans, interest 
is charged, but little or no money is created. So to the extent that that 
argument is valid, it is incorrect to say that we pay interest on money 
issued to us by commercial banks. 
  
2. FR benefits the environment and equality.  
Claimed by Dyson (2013).   
Answer. One can subsidise windfarms (or not) under fractional reserve, 
and ditto for full reserve. Plus tax on CO2 emitting fuels can be raised (or 
not) under both full and fractional reserve. Thus the environment has 
little to do with the full versus fractional reserve argument. 
It is also hard to see why the PATTERN of consumption would change 
much give a switch to FR. That is, the proportion of family budgets spent 
on cars, food, housing, clothes would not change much. Thus there are 
no obvious environmental effects. 
As for inequalities, same applies. FR ought to ameliorate the boom / 
bust cycle, which in turn would reduce the periods of high unemployment 
that come after the bust. And that clearly reduces inequalities 
SOMEWHAT. But there is no obvious reason why equality is an issue 
that is closely related to the full versus fractional reserve argument. 
 
3. Without debt there would be no money. 
I.e. Commercial banks create money when they lend, thus without debt 
there would be no money. That is an idea put by Rowbotham (1998). 
Answer. The answer to that point is spelled out essentially in section 3.1 
just above, that is, when a commercial bank SIMPLY creates money, no 
long term debt is involved. While in contrast, when a commercial bank 
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grants a long term loan, it can well be argued that little money creation is 
involved.  
 
4. Interest condemns borrowers to perpetual debt. 
That is, the money which commercial banks lend out does not supply 
borrowers with the money to pay interest to said banks, thus, so the 
argument goes, borrowers are condemned to permanently increasing or 
never ending debt: an idea put by Rowbotham (1998). 
Answer. The flaw in the above point is very simple. It is that interest 
paid to banks is subsequently returned to households in numerous 
forms: 1, interest payments by banks to depositors, 2, dividend 
payments to bank shareholders, 3, payments to bank staff and a large 
range of other costs that banks have to meet, like upkeep of offices and 
buying computers. 
Of course the latter paragraph blurs the distinction between interest and 
administration costs somewhat. That distinction is spelled out more 
clearly in section 3.1 above. 
 
5. Full reserve is a huge bonanza for everyone? 
The large majority of money is created by commercial banks rather than 
central banks. It is tempting to deduce from that that were that 
commercial bank created money produced by the state or central bank 
instead, that the state would reap the relevant seigniorage profits and 
would thus be able to spend large additional amounts on health, 
education and so on. Alternatively taxes could allegedly be reduced by 
the relevant amount with the result that households would have large 
additional amounts to spend. That argument is put in a Positive Money 
article: Positive Money (2013). 
The obvious flaw in that argument is that assuming the economy is 
already at capacity, or nearly so, the above additional spending on 
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various public sector items just won’t be possible: excess inflation would 
ensue if that seigniorage money WERE SPENT. 
Alternatively, if the economy is nowhere near capacity, then of course 
spending the above additional base money WOULD BE 
STIMULATORY, that is, the additional spending would be beneficial.  
But the state can create and spend any amount of new base money it 
likes any time it wants. Thus the above replacement of commercial bank 
money by state or central bank money does not of itself achieve 
anything. 
_________ 
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